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CASE NOTES
Bankruptcy-Use of Chapter X or XI Proceedings.-Petitioner, a corpora-
tion, instituted proceedings under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, seeking
an extension of its unsecured indebtedness. It proposed an arrangement of its
general unsecured trade and commercial debts. Petitioner had no debts of any
nature which were publicly held, but had over two million shares of one dollar
par value common stock listed on the American Stock Exchange and held by
over seven thousand shareholders. An owner of three thousand shares and the
Securities and Exchange Commission moved for a dismissal of the proceeding
unless the petition be amended to comply with the requirements of Chapter X
of the Bankruptcy Act for a corporate reorganization. The District Court
granted the motion. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon certiorari,
held, two justices dissenting, affirmed. There being no specific tests set forth in
the statutes, the court may exercise its discretion in deciding whether Chap-
ter X or XI is more suitable to serve the needs of corporate reorganization.
General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956).
The problem of determining whether to proceed under Chapter X or M
in a particular corporate reorganization has been the subject of controversy'
since the passage of the Chandler Act.2 This problem was caused by the failure
of the act to specify the criteria for determining which chapter is applicable.
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act provides for corporate reorganization,3
while Chapter XI deals with arrangements, i.e., any plan of the debtor for
the settlement of his unsecured debts. The fundamental purpose of both
chapters, as contrasted with straight bankruptcy, is the preservation of the
debtor's business 5
The purpose of Chapter X is to avoid immediate liquidation with a view
to rehabilitation, to afford a delay to corporations in financial difficulties so
that owners and creditors may have time to refinance or recapitalize in order
to preserve the intangible values of a going business, to give owners of mort-
gage bonds an opportunity to have the corporation reorganized in lieu of
1. Weintraub, Levin, and Novick, Chapter X or Chapter XI: Coexistence for the Mid-
die-Sized Corporation, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 616 (1956); Levin, Weintraub, and Singer,
The Third Year of Arrangements under the Bankruptcy Act: Crossroads and Signposts,
18 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 375, 379 (1941); Rostow and Cutler, Competing Systems of Cor-
porate Reorganization: Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 43 Yala L". 1334
(1939); 40 Colum. L. Rev. 1245, 1249 (1940).
2. Act of June 22, 1933, c. 575, 52 Stat. S40 (codified in scattered s-ctions of 11
U.S.C.A.).
3. Bankruptcy Act § 106, 11 U.S.C.A. 506 (1946).
4. Bankruptcy Act § 306, 11 U.S.C.A. 706(1) (1946).
5. "The purpose of the reorganization sections is to maintain the status-quo until a
reasonable opportunity has been afforded to submit a plan." 11 Remington § 4345
(1947).
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liquidation under foreclosure,6 to avoid cumbersome and expensive equity re-
ceiverships,7 and to avoid forced sales under judgments.8
Chapter XI developed as an amendment to prior legislative acts providing
for compositions with creditors and extensions of time for the payment of obli-
gations.9 It was designed ". . . to keep the affairs of a debtor who can offer
a fair arrangement acceptable to most of his creditors out of bankruptcy ...
substituting the arrangement, with certain safeguards, for the usual bank-
ruptcy administration and discharge."'1
It is generally felt that Chapter XI was designed to afford a debtor a simple
plan by which he can extricate himself from current financial difficulty with
a minimum disturbance to his business." Under Chapter XI, subject to the
authorization of the court, the debtor may remain in possession and manage
his business,' 2 and with the approval of his creditors formulate a plan of ar-
rangement.' 3  On the other hand, the provisions of Chapter X are broader
and more stringent. It provides for intricate processes of reorganizing capital
and debt structures. If the liabilities do not amount to $250,000, the court
may appoint a trustee to operate the business or allow the debtor to continue
in control of the business;' 4 but if the liabilities are over that sum, the judge
must appoint a trustee who will operate the business,'6 investigate the prior
acts and conduct of the debtor,16 and formulate a plan of reorganization sub-
ject to court approval.' 7
The question in the instant case was raised in the United States Realty'8
case, where the Court stated that no definition existed in either chapter which
relegates a corporate reorganization exclusively to one chapter rather than the
other. The test laid down as to whether Chapter XI should apply was to be
found in a determination whether there was ". .. public or private interests
involved requiring protection by the procedure and remedies afforded by chap-
ter X.' 9 However, when the court was confronted with the issue in the Trans-
6. In re Western Tool & Mfg. Co., 142 F. 2d 404 (6th Cir. 1944), rev'd sub nom.
Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100 (1945).
7. "Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, as well as the Chandler Act (Chapter X1,
were adopted as a method of administering the property of an embarrassed debtor more
justly and expeditiously than under the old equity receivership, which was also designed
for staving off impatient creditors in the course of reorganization." Sword S.S. Line v.
Vendramis, 116 F. 2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1944).
8. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
9. 9 Remington §§ 3564-65 (1955).
10. Id. at § 3565.
11. In re Transvision, Inc., 217 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 952
(1955).
12. Bankruptcy Act §§ 342-43, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 742-43 (1946).
13. Bankruptcy Act § 323, 11 U.S.C.A. § 723 (1946).
14. Bankruptcy Act § 156, 11 U.S.C.A. § 556 (1946).
15. Ibid.
16. Bankruptcy Act § 167, 11 U.S.C.A. 567 (1946).
17. Bankruptcy Act § 175, 11 U.S.CA. § 575 (1946).
18. SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940).
19. Id. at 454.
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vision case,20 it did not rely solely upon that proposition. There the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission moved that the corporation be reorganized
under Chapter X because of public ownership of a substantial part of the
stock. The court ruled that public ownership of stock was only a factor to
be considered and not determinative. The court emphasized that all factors
are to be weighed by the court in arriving at their decision.
The Court in the instant case devised a rule to enable it to decide when
Chapter X or XI should apply. It concluded that the essential difference be-
tween the two chapters was the needs to be served. When the problem arises
the court must look to all the surrounding circumstances, including the source
of the difficulties, past and present, keeping in mind the needs of all interests
concerned, including those of the debtor. In applying the test, the Court ex-
amined the history of the debtor, and in so doing found one corporate re-
organization had already been suffered. Furthermore, heavy short-term loans
hung over the large corporation; it had been converted from an operating to
a holding company with the shares of its subsidiaries pledged to creditors.
Noting the possible need for recapitalization or merger with subsidiaries, the
Court, after considering all the surrounding facts and circumstances which had
any bearing upon the corporation, decided that a Chapter XI proceeding would
not be suitable.
Apparently the dissent favored the rule laid down by the majority of the
Court, but reasoned that such standards were not applied by the trial court
in this case. They also argued that the majority, in applying their test, dis-
regarded the amendment to Chapter XI eliminating the requirement that a
plan of arrangement had to be "fair and equitable," 2' which the dissent con-
tends enlarges the availability of Chapter XI. But that consideration by itself
should not be the determinative factor, but merely one of the factors to be con-
sidered by the court in determining which chapter is more appropriate.
It has been suggested that Congress restrict the use of Chapter XI to firms
having no more than $250,000 indebtedness,22 or to firms having no more
than one hundred public shareholders.2 3 Unless Congress clearly defines the
bounds of each chapter, it remains for the courts in each case to determine
which proceeding is more appropriate for the needs of the parties.
Conflicts of Laws-Characterization-Substance and Procedure-Public
Policy-Direct Action Against Insurer under Louisiana Statute.--Respond-
ent, a resident of New York, was injured in Louisiana while a passenger in a
motor vehicle whose owner was insured by the defendant insurer. A Louisi-
20. See note 11 supra.
21. Bankruptcy Act § 366 (1938), as amended, Bankruptcy Act § 366, 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 766 (1946).
22. Hearings before Special Subcommittee on Bankruptcy and Reorganization, HR. 9064,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
23. Wham, Some Recent Developments in Corporate Reorganizations, 18 N.Y.U.L.Q.
Rev. 352, 360 (1941).
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ana statute permits the injured party, without first obtaining judgment against
the tortfeasor, to sue the insurer directly either in the parish where the acci-
dent occurred or in the parish where the insured has his domicile. Respondent
instituted a direct action against the insurance company in the New York
Supreme Court. Appellant's motion for summary judgment was denied at
special term on the basis inter alia that there was a triable issue as to whether
the requirement that the action be commenced in the specified parishes was
substantive or procedural. On appeal, held, two justices dissenting, reversed.
The venue provisions of the Louisiana statute are substantive in nature; they
present no triable issue of fact and defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment should be granted. The Louisiana statute is moreover offensive to the
public policy of New York, and New York courts may, therefore, decline to
take jurisdiction. Morton v. Maryland Cas. Co., 1 A.D. 2d 116, 148 N.Y.S. 2d
524 (2d Dep't 1955).
The Louisiana statute here involved, by permitting a direct action against
the insurer contrary to provisions of the policy of insurance, creates a
right which did not exist at common law.' Since a tort action is transitory in
nature2 it is clear that the insurer is amenable to process in New York. Tra-
ditional conflicts rules would then permit New York, as the forum, to charac-
terize the Louisiana direct action statute as either substantive and applicable,
or procedural and inapplicable. 3 The majority, here, first determined that the
statute as a whole was substantive.4 It then isolated the venue requirements
of the statute and found them to be substantive as well.a This particular
finding was, of course, determinative of the action and warranted the entry of
summary judgment" which had been denied by the trial court.7
1. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 655 (1950) "The injured person or his or her
heirs, at their option shall have a right of direct action against the insurer within
the terms and limits of the policy in the parish where the accident or injury occurred
or in the parish where the insured has his domicile, and said action may be brought
against the insurer alone or against both the insured and the insurer, jointly and in
solido."
2. See Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 470, 3 N.E. 2d 597, 598 (1936) which declares
the New York courts have jurisdiction of transitory actions, and Huntington v. Attrlll,
146 U.S. 657, 670 (1892) which declares that a tort committed in one state creates
a right of action that may be sued upon in another unless public policy forbids.
3. See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 81 (3d ed. 1949).
4. West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950).
5. The federal district courts in Louisiana which have jurisdiction on diversity of
citizenship have never regarded the venue requirements of the Louisiana statute as pre-
cluding the granting of relief. Their position in recent years has been to take jurisdiction,
characterize the statute as substantive, and then declare it unconstitutional, as in Bayard
v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 99 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. La. 1951), or else to declare it vali-
dated by the consent provision enacted and applicable, as in Buxton v. Midwestern
Ins. Co., 102 F. Supp. 500 (W.D. La. 1952).
6. See General Inv. Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 235 N.Y. 133, 139 N.E.
216 (1923). The granting of judgment is predicated on the absence of a bona fide
triable issue.
7. Morton v. Maryland Cas. Co., 134 N.Y.S. 2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
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The argument advanced by the majority to support its conclusions involves
an evaluation of the rights which the Louisiana legislature intended to confer
by passing the direct action statute. The majority felt that since the cause
of action is a creature of statute any limitations incorporated in its enact-
ment are to be regarded as substantive limitations on the rights themselves.8
It found support for its position in wrongful death actions where time limita-
tions, placed upon such actions by the enacting state, control the case in the
forum9 despite the seemingly procedural nature of the restrictions."0 The
venue limitations are here found in the section, and indeed in the very sen-
tence which creates the right of action, a forceful indication that the legisla-
ture intended them as substantive restrictions.
The majority also considered of importance the fact that the insurer, as a
condition precedent to doing business in Louisiana, filed a consent to be sued
directly in that state."1  The consent, it noted, was expressly limited to ac-
tions instituted in Louisiana.
In all of these considerations the majority would seem to be proceeding on
reasonably firm and traditional footing; but it did not stop there. In a pro-
longed dictum it showed a strong aversion for direct action suits which it
found repulsive to the public policy of New York.
Exactly what constitutes the public policy of a jurisdiction is difficult to
determine. Need a foreign statute ". . . violate some fundamental principle
of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradi-
tion of the common weal ... .", to be against the public policy of New York?2
In Mertz v. Mertz, the Court of Appeals said, ". .. when we speak of the
public policy of the state we mean the law of the state, whether found in
the Constitution, the statutes, or judicial records."13 A later Appellate Division
interpretation of the Mertz case suggested: "This definition cannot he
taken to mean that for all purposes every statute represents a statement of
public policy. If such were the case, no statutory provision could be waived."' 4
It would seem, then, that to find in New York a public policy against direct
action suits it is not necessary to have a statute expressly prohibiting them;
but it would appear that an implicit prohibition must be found in the consensus
of presently effective statutes or prior judicial pronouncements.
The majority found this implicit prohibition in several ways. It noted the
strict judicial interpretation heretofore given to every legslative extension
of a third party's rights against insurers. As a less important consideration,
S. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 86 (3d ed. 1949).
9. Weis v. Baviello, 133 N.YS.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1954), afi'd without opinion, 286 App.
Div. 1024, 146 N.Y.S.2d 674 (2d Dep't 1955); Schwertfeger v. Scandinavian American
Line, 186 App. Div. 89, 174 N.Y.S. 147 (1st Dep't 1919).
10. Sharrow v. Inland Lines Ltd, 214 N.Y. 101, 103 N.E. 217 (1915).
11. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 983(e) (1950).
12. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 193, 202 (1918).
13. 271 N.Y. 466, 472, 3 N.E.2d 597, 599 (1936).




perhaps, it saw a need to protect insurers against the predatory activities of
juries, which is in part accomplished by proscribing any mention of the fact
that a defendant is insured. Finally, the majority noted that Louisiana de-
cisions purporting to construe the statute in question denied to the insurer as
against the injured third party defenses which the company may have against
the insured-a provision "diametrically opposed" to section 167 of the New
York Insurance Law.
The initial distinction made by the court stresses that liberalization in this
area of insurance has come exclusively from the legislature. Whatever the
source of the liberalization it now represents the public policy of this state.
It would be difficult to conclude that for the courts now to adopt a liberal
rather than a restrictive attitude would be against public policy. Public policy
is after all variable and "changes with changing conditions."'' Moreover, New
York does allow suits against insurers even where the action is not based on
a judgment in order to determine their possible liability by means of im-
pleader. 16 Finally, the contention that Louisiana does not allow the insurer
to urge his defenses against the insured upon an action by an injured party is
contrary to the express wording of the Louisiana statute involved.' 7 The case
supposedly announcing the former interpretation was concerned solely with
a defense based on the failure of the insured to notify the company of the
accident or injury.'8 Under the New York Insurance Law this same defense
has at present been rendered less important by the liberalization of the New
York statute. 19
There are Constitutional implications in the present decision which were
not alluded to by the court. The decisions might well be considered in the
light of a series of Workmen's Compensation cases which evince a new trend
of reasoning in the United States Supreme Court. 20 These decisions21 have
15. Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 254 N.Y. 407, 413, 173 N.E. 564, 566 (1930).
16. An insurer denying liability to its insured under a policy may be Impleaded,
Brooklyn Yarn Dye Co. v. Empire State Warehouses Corp., 276 App. Div. 611, 96
N.Y.S.2d 738 (2d Dep't 1950).
17. "Nothing contained in this Section shall be construed to affect the provisions of the
policy or contract if the same are not in violation of the laws of this state. It is the intent
of this Section that any action brought hereunder shall be subject to all the lawful condi-
tions of the policy or contract and the defenses which could be urged by the insurer to a
direct action brought by the insured, provided the terms and conditions of such policy or
contract are not in violation of the laws of this state." La. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 655
(1950).
18. See note 4 supra.
19. N.Y. Insurance Law § 167(1)(c) provides that notice given by the insured or by or
on behalf of the injured party to any licensed agent of the insurer is deemed to be notice
to the insurer. Notice is deemed to be sufficient if "given as soon as was reasonably pos-
sible." § 167(1)(d).
20. Note, 64 Yale L.J. 940, 949 (1955).
21. Specifically, Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S.
493 (1939), as embodied in Watson v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66
(1954).
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modified what has been called the extraterritorial limitations of due process -
by adopting the test of sufficient governmental interest. The forum is allowed
to apply its own law despite contrary provisions of an otherwise applicable
foreign statute when the forum has a sufficient governmental concern. A
sufficient governmental interest may be anything from concern for the wel-
fare of accident victims2 3 to the mere fact that the forum is also the place of
the tort.24
In Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,5 a case concerned with
the application of the present statute, the type of reasoning employed in the
later Workmen's Compensation cases was employed to allow an injured third
party to bring a Louisiana action against an insurer contrary to the express
provisions of the insurance policy which had been executed outside of Louisi-
ana. The court overruled the insurer's constitutional objections2 not on the
basis of the statutory consent of the insurer (which was licensed to do busi-
ness in Louisiana) but upon the much broader grounds that Louisiana's con-
cern for the welfare of the injured plaintiff gave Louisiana a sufficient inter-
est to apply its direct action statute.
The question now arises whether the governmental interest test can be
utilized to compel New York to enforce the Louisiana statute$7 In other words
might a superior governmental interest of the jurisdiction in which the cause
of action arose be utilized to compel the forum to accept the cause of action.
The Watson case, it must be remembered, decided the reverse situation, viz.,
whether the governmental interest of the forum allowed it to apply its law at
the expense of the law of the place of contract.
It is suggested that the interest which Louisiana has in the cause of action
bears on whether New York may properly refuse to apply the Louisiana law.
Suppose in the present case the insurance company were a Louisiana corpora-
tion, the plaintiff a resident of Louisiana and the contract of insurance exe-
cuted in Louisiana; suppose then the only New York contact were the de-
fendant's New York residence. Might not Louisiana's paramount interest then
be advanced to compel New York to apply the Louisiana statute? In the
present case, however, Louisiana has no interest beyond being the place of the
tort. New York on the other hand is concerned with the protection of the
insurer and is the residence of the injured suitor. New York for all intents
and purposes has a greater governmental interest than Louisiana in the out-
come of the decision.
22. See Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143
(1934) where the Supreme Court found that Mississippi could not apply its longer statute
of limitations where the tort occurred in ississippi because the insurance contract bad
been made in Tennessee and Tennessee law governed.
23. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Conm'n of Cal., 294 US. 532 (1935).
24. Carrol v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 403 (1955).
25. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
26. Equal protection of laws, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; impairment of contracL
US. Const. art. 1 § 10; due process, U.S. Const. amend. Xr, § 1.
27. See Note, 64 Yale LJ. 940, 947 (1955).
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The result of this decision, however, is to remit the respondent to Louisiana
to enforce his rights against the insurer, a considerable burden which will in
many cases prevent any adjudication of the issue. The Supreme Court has
shown itself cognizant of the hardship inflicted on a plaintiff by refusing him
use of a convenient forum and underscores this consideration in the Watson
case. 2 8 We cannot, however, say that the award of summary judgment in the
instant case will be regarded for this reason as a violation of due process.
The characterization advanced by the New York court indicates that it is
implementing to the full the Louisiana statute.
This position is at variance it must be noted with the action of the federal
courts in Louisiana which have always regarded the venue requirements in
question as no bar to suits in the federal forums 2 9 Still, it is the forum's
right to characterize, and the characterization accorded by the New York court,
in conjunction with the still admissible arguments of public policy, indicate no
lack of due process. It would appear therefore that this case presents no
potentially successful constitutional basis for review on the grounds of denial
of due process.30
Subsequent to the date of the present decision and without knowledge of
it, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined the case of Collins
v. American Automobile Ins. Co.31 Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citi-
zenship and under the Erie R.R. v. Tompkins32 doctrine New York law in-
cluding its conflicts rules,33 was applicable. The federal court ruled that New
York law does not preclude the enforcement of the Louisiana direct action
because the substantive nature of the statute would earn it recognition in
conformity with principles of conflicts in a New York court. Further, the
court found reason to believe that a New York court would not refuse to en-
force the statute on public policy grounds because of the liberality of New
York courts in enforcing foreign acquired rights even when no equivalent
is found in the laws of this state, and because of the New York rule per-
mitting the impleading of insurance companies. Interestingly enough the court
also characterized the venue requirements holding that the "more reasonable
view" is to regard them as mere requirements of Louisiana procedure with
no effect beyond the limits of the state.3
Although there is at present a clear divergence of interpretation between the
federal and state decisions on this point of direct action the federal position
is interesting only in pointing out the relative reasonableness of the state's in-
terpretation. It would seem that the state court's characterization of the venue
28. Watson v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
29. See note 5 supra.
30. See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 81 (3d ed. 1949), which declares that an out-
rageous characterization may be violative of due process. See also John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
31. 230 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1956).
32. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
33. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
34. 230 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1956).
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requirements and its interposition of the doctrine of public policy are overly
protective of the rights of the insurer at the expense of the injured party. The
state's position is, however, tenable and immune from constitutional attack.
It would follow, therefore, that federal courts in New York will follow the
state court's view and, indeed, it would seem clear that they are required to
do so.-
Due Process of Law-Net Worth Prosecution-Right to Accounting
Services.-Defendant was indicted under section 145(b) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1939 for filing false and fraudulent income tax returns. The
indictment contained three counts, each count covering a year in which there
was an alleged violation. The government proposed to employ the net worth
method to prove that defendant had willfully reported lesser sums than he had
actually earned. Prior to trial, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on
the grounds that he could not properly prepare his defense in so complex a
case without assistance of an accountant and that the government through
jeopardy assessments and tax liens had impounded his funds to the extent
that he was unable to hire an accountant. This, defendant reasoned, amounted
to a denial of due process. Held, indictment dismissed. Bringing a criminal
action against defendant while at the same time attaching all of his assets so
that he is unable to retain an accountant for the preparation of his defense
is a denial of his right to effective counsel as guaranteed by the Constitution.
United States v. Brodson, 136 F. Supp. 158 (ED. Wis. 1955).
Faced with the difficulty of proving willful violations of the income tax
law by direct evidence, the government, as far back as 1931, began to use
circumstantial evidence to show that defendant had ended the years speci-
fled in the indictment with greater assets than he had on hand at the begin-
ning of those years.' Once the government had further proved that this in-
crease was not reported in defendant's income tax statements, it was possible
for the jury to infer a willful attempt to defraud the government. Originally
this method of proof was used only as additional evidence corroborative of
some direct proof of unreported income. Gradually the courts gave the govern-
ment greater latitude in its use until in 1943 the Supreme Court upheld a
conviction where the government's case was established on purely circumstan-
tial evidence.2 This method of proving, by circumstantial evidence alone, a
willful attempt to defraud the government came to be known as the "net
worth" method. "The net worth method, it seems, has evolved from the final
volley to the first shot in the Government's battle for revenue, and its use in
the ordinary income bracket cases greatly increases the chances for error."3
35. See note 33 supra.
1. Capone v. United States, 51 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1931); Guzik v. United States,
54 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1931).
2. United States v. Johnson, 319 US. 503 (1943).
3. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 126 (1954). Originally net worth %,,s
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These "chances for error" caused the Supreme Court in 1954, in four de-
cisions handed down on the same day, to review and reconsider the entire
net worth doctrine.4 The prosecution, in a net worth case, the court explained,
first must establish an "opening net worth", that is, the total net value of
defendant's assets at the beginning of a given year.5 It then must prove in-
creases in his net worth for each succeeding year in the period under examina-
tion and calculate the difference between the adjusted net values of defendant's
assets at the beginning and end of each year involved. Finally, defendant's
non-deductible expenses are added and if the final figure, thus deduced, amounts
to more than his reported income, the government concludes that the difference
represents unreported income.0 Defendant's willfulness may be inferred from
proof of actions the nature of which would be likely to mislead or conceal.7
This method of proof, wrote the Court, while ". . . useful in the enforcement
of the criminal sanctions of our income tax laws ... is so fraught with danger
for the innocent that the courts must closely scrutinize its use.8 ... Trial courts
should approach these cases in the full realization that the taxpayer may be
ensnared in a system which, though difficult for the prosecution to utilize,
is equally hard for the defendant to refute."0
Thus, in the instant case, the court was fearful that the defendant, with-
out the aid of an accountant, might find it impossible to trace his acquisition
of the questioned assets. Possibly such income might have accrued in years
prior to those specified in the indictment. Presuming this to be so, once the
government had presented its case, it would be incumbent upon the defendant
to bring forth evidence of these prior transactions in order to explain the ap-
parent increase in his assets.10 Once defendant had done this, the burden
would then be on the government to prove that such sources could not ac-
count for the assets shown. Failing that, the government would not have sus-
tained its burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt." "Once the
Government has established its case defendant remains quiet at his peril."12
used only where the sums withheld were extremely large, but in recent years the trend
has been to use it regardless of the amount involved.
4. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954); Friedberg v. United States, 348
U.S. 142 (1954); Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954); United States v. Calderon,
348 U.S. 160 (1954).
5. United States v. Chapman, 168 F. 2d 997 (7th Cir. 1948); United States v. Skid-
more, 123 F. 2d 604 (7th Cir. 1941).
6. United States v. Altruda, 224 F. 2d 935 (2d Cir. 1955); Sasser v. United States, 208
F. 2d 535 (5th Cir. 1953); Bell v. United States, 185 F. 2d 302 (4th Cir. 1950); United
States v. Potson, 171 F. 2d 495 (7th Cir. 1948).
7. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943); Battjes v. United States, 172 F. 2d
1 (6th Cir. 1949); United States v. Chapman, 168 F. 2d 997 (7th Cir. 1948); 10 Mcr-
tens, Federal Income Taxation § 55.34-55.40 (rev. ed. 1948).
8. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 125 (1954).
9. Id. at 129.
10. Beard v. United States, 222 F. 2d 84 (4th Cir. 1955).
11. United States v. Fenwick, 177 F. 2d 488 (7th Cir. 1949); Bryan v. United States,
175 F. 2d 223 (5th Cir. 1949).
12. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 138 (1954).
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By indicting defendant on a criminal charge while at the same time attaching
his assets so that he cannot afford an accountant, the government would find
it possible to hamper defendant's ability to defend himself so that he would
in effect be deprived of his constitutional right to due process.' 3
For this reason, during the oral argument of the motion, the court in-
structed the parties that if defendant, who was represented by court appointed
counsel, were to file an extremely broad affidavit showing that he had no
assets of any kind and none were procurable by him, and if the government
did not then see fit to put a reasonable amount of the seized assets in escrow
with the clerk of the court, subject to order of the court for use in reasonably
necessary preparation for trial, the court would be inclined to the view that
defendant was being deprived of the right to a fair trial. The affidavit referred
to here was to be sufficiently broad that if it proved to be false, it could form
the basis of a perjury conviction. When the government failed to provide the
funds requested, the court, terming the government's action "holding and
hitting", granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment.
In the course of its opinion, the court cited, among others, two cases,
O'Connor v. United States14 and Homan Mfg. Co. v. Sauber,15 which appear
to be the only previous cases touching on this issue. In the O'Connor case,
defendant was in full possession of his property twenty-two months after the
filing of the indictment, but before the levy of the jeopardy assessment, and
there was no showing that the levy hampered his defense in any way. In the
Homan case, defendant started proceedings for an injunction to restrain the
tax authorities from taking his assets where a criminal action was pending.
The district director moved to dismiss and dissolve the temporary restraining
order. The court continued a temporary restraining order with the provision
that the plaintiff be granted leave to apply to the court for release of such
funds as might be necessary to defend itself in the criminal and tax proceed-
ings and to maintain its corporate existence. In another case,10 decided after
the Brodson case, the court cited Brodson but held that defendant failed to
establish that he had insufficient assets with which properly to prepare a
defense.' 7
13. The indictment in this case was returned on April 1, 1953. But, in conjunction
-with a civil suit then pending for back taxes, the government levied jeopardy a-aEss-
ments and tax liens on defendant's property, depriving him of all assets since Oct. 1951.
See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 273, 3670-72 (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 6321-25).
These jeopardy assessments and liens attach to all property and assets which the defendant
might otherwise have available to finance his defense. The lien even attaches to proparty
which is acquired after the lien has arisen.
14. 203 F. 2d 301 (4th Cir. 1953).
15. Civ. No. 55-C-1541, ND. Ill., Sept. 29, 1955.
16. United States v. Allied Stevedoring, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
17. The officers of the corporation were indicted as individuals and made co-defend-
ants with the corporation in the action. Though the corporation filed an affidavit sh owing
insufficient assets to hire an accountant, the individuals failed to do so. The court held
that the corporation was the medium used by the defendants in transacting their busi-
ness and that the corporation would reap the benefit of any accounting services supplied
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The rationale of the instant case, that defendant's right to counsel in a
criminal case means right to effective counsel and that the government can-
not be permitted to impound defendant's assets while at the same time
bringing against him a criminal action impossible to defend without those
assets, is supported by other cases which have considered the point as well
as the Supreme Court's warning of the dangers in the Holland case. The only
point that remains is whether the drastic remedy,18 dismissing the indictment,
was the only possible remedy under the circumstances.
The court pointed out that it did not have the power to force the govern-
ment to release the requested funds, nor had it the power to dissolve the tax
lien.' 9 Unless, therefore, some other source of accounting services could be
found for the defendant, dismissal of the indictment is the only way in which
the court could protect defendant's rights.
The government suggested, as a possible source of accounting services, a
court appointed accountant, serving as an expert witness under the provisions
of rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.20 The government con-
tended that if it waived that part of the rule requiring the expert to "advise
the parties of its findings," the expert would be able to serve defendant alone.
The court rejected the proposal stating that, ". . . the disbursing officer might
well question this procedure, if not refuse payment, because the rule would
not be followed."'21 It considered the language of the statute to be mandatory,
i.e., "A witness so appointed shall advise .... "22 There is nothing in the rule
to indicate that a case such as the one at hand had ever been contemplated
by Congress. If the rule will accommodate such a use at all, it seems that
its fabric would have to be stretched to the utmost to make it fit.
In United States v. Allied Stevedoring, Inc.,23 the court in dictum noted
that before dismissal of the indictment defendant should be required to show
that free accounting services were unavailable. Having shown this, since due
by the individuals.
18. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3288, 3289 provide for re-indictment after the dismissal of an
indictment.
19. Tomlinson v. Poller, 220 F. 2d 308 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, Pace v. Tomlin-
son, 350 US. 832 (1955). Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3653(a) (now Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 7421(a)) denies courts the power to restrain the collection of a federal tax, nor
does the government have the power to release the funds. Int. Rev. Code 1939, §§ 3673,
3674, 3675 (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6325). In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United
States, 167 F. 2d 311, 313 (6th Cir. 1939) the court stated: "The Federal statutes create
specific liens for taxes as a corollary give a specific remedy for their removal
and when such liens once attach they may be lifted only as provided thereunder."
20. Fed. R. Crim. P. 28 provides, ". . . The court may appoint any expert witnesses
agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint witnesses of its own selection. . . . A wit-
ness so appointed shall advise the parties of his findings, if any, and may thereafter be
called to testify by the court or by any party ......
21. A dictum in United States v. Allied Stevedoring, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y.
1956), suggested that in a proper case the rule might be so used.
22. Emphasis added.
23. 138 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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process required that defendant have the assistance of an accountant in "net
worth" cases, if rule 28 could not be utilized, it would follow that in any case
where defendant's funds have been impounded, or where defendant cannot
afford an accountant, the government is barred from prosecuting.
Elections-Redistricting-Failure of Territorial Legslature to Reapportion
-Right to Enjoin Compliance.-Plaintiff, a voter on the island of Oahu,
Territory of Hawaii, alleged that contrary to the Organic Act of Hawaii, the
territorial legislature had not reapportioned itself to adjust to shifts in popu-
lation for the past fifty-five years and thus deprived him of equal protection
of the laws in his rights of suffrage, due process of law, and a right secured
him by a law of the United States. Defendants (members of the territorial
legislature, the Governor, the Secretary and a disbursing agent of the United
States Treasury Department) contended that the complaint failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted and that the court lacked jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter. Upon motion to dismiss complaint, held, motion
denied. Failure of the legislature to reapportion resulted in an arbitrary dis-
crimination, a violation of due process. Plaintiff is given a right of action by
the Civil Rights Act. Dyer v. Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii 1956).
The problem of the "rotten borough"' presented here has for ages been a
weakness and a thorn in the side of democratic forms of government.2 Citi-
zens, finding themselves "under-represented" and the value of their vote a
fraction of that of a resident of a different geographic area within the same
state as a result of a failure of the legislature to reapportion, have several
courses of action open to them. The voter may attempt to elect a legislature
which will reapportion, but the tendency of such bodies toward self-perpetua-
tion dooms him to failure; the evil he seeks to correct deprives him of suffi-
cient voting power. Secondly, the citizen may attempt to enact appropriate
legislation by initiative, 3 but such a solution is difficult to accomplish because
1. For an extensive treatment of the subject see Legislative Reapportionment, 17 Law
& Contemp. Prob. No. 2 (1952); Durfee, Apportionment of Representation in the
Legislature: A Study of State Constitutions, 43 Mich. L. Rev. 1091 (1945).
2. Failure to reapportion was a major source of the abuses leading to the English
Reform Bill of 1832. Of that failure "... the result has been concisely stated as follows:
'The majority of the house of commons was elected by less than fifteen thousand persons.
Seventy members were returned by thirty-five places with scarcely any voters at all;
ninety members were returned by forty-six places with no more than fifty voters;
thirty-seven members by nineteen places with no more than one hundred voters; fifty-two
members by twenty-six places with no more than two hundred voters. The local dis-
tribution of the representation was flagrantly unfair. ... Cornwall was a corrupt nest
of little boroughs whose vote outweighed that of great and populous districts. At Old
Sarum, a deserted site, at Gatton an ancient wall sent two representatives to the house
of commons'." 11 Hunt & Poole, The Political History of England, at 283-S9 (1905).
3. This is a process by which laws may be introduced or enacted directly by vote of
the people. Such a process usually requires that a certain percentage of the qualified
voters sign a petition for the measure before it may be put on the ballot. This process
may be used in many of the states.
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public inertia must be overcome, and it has found a poor reception in the
courts. The Missouri Supreme Court nullified an apportionment by initiative4
and a Massachusetts court declared the method inapplicable to the creation
of state senatorial and representative districts. The third, and most frequently
employed method, is resort to the courts, but the traditional view in the United
States is that the doctrine of separation of powers renders the state legisla-
tures immune to mandamus6 and the courts will refuse to effect indirectly
that which they may not do directly.7
The doctrine that an apportionment act, like any other, is subject to judi-
cial review is not now seriously questioned.8
In reviewing an existing apportionment act, the courts have thus dis-
tinguished between mandatory and discretionary state constitutional pro-
visions,9 e.g., a prohibition against a district containing less than four-fifths
of a senatorial ration or a proviso that districts must be bounded by county
lines would be considered mandatory; other requirements with reference to
the equality of districts in point of population and the necessity for compact-
ness of territory would be considered discretionary' ° and would not be en-
forced."
Further, such failure to comply with the constitutional provisions on the
part of the legislature would not render that body and its acts invalid; the
duty to reapportion devolves upon succeeding legislatures1 2 and legislatures
continuing under an old act and failing to reapportion are held to be de facto
bodies whose acts are valid.' 3
The general trend has been to the effect that the courts will now step in and
see to it that the legislatures do not overstep the bounds of their state con-
4. State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, 130 S.W. 689 (1910).
5. In re Opinion of the Justices, 254 Mass. 617, 151 N.E. 680 (1926).
6. State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 241 Mo. 433, 146 S.W. 40 (1912); People ex rel.
Woodyatt v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451, 40 N.E. 307 (1895).
7. E.g., the court refused to invalidate acts of a legislature sitting under an obsolete
apportionment. People v. Clardy, 334 Il. 160, 165 N.E. 638 (1929). The court dis-
missed a suit to restrain payment of legislator's salaries. Fergus v. Kinney, 333 Ill. 473,
164 N.E. 665 (1928).
8. The only major dissent to this view was expressed by the Virginia court in Wise
v. Bigger, 79 Va. 269 (1884), where it was held that the courts lacked the power to re-
view an apportionment act. The case was specifically overruled in Brown v. Saunders, 159
Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105 (1932).
9. People ex rel. Heffernan v. Carlock, 198 Il. 150, 65 N.E. 109 (1902); State ex rel.
Attorney General v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724 (1892). See also Walter,
Reapportionment of State Legislative Districts, 37 Ill. L. Rev. 20 (1942).
10. People ex rel. Heffernan v. Carlock, 198 Ill. 150, 65 N.E. 109 (1902).
11. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724 (1892).
12. Fergus v. Kinney, 333 11. 437, 164 N.E. 665 (1928); Matter of Reynolds, 202
N.Y. 430, 96 N.E. 87 (1911); In re Constitutionality of Proposed Reapportionment Bill,
12 Colo. 186, 21 Pac. 480 (1889).
13. In re Sherrill, 188 N.Y. 185, 81 N.E. 124 (1907); Denney v. State ex rel. Basler,
144 Ind. 503, 42 N.E. 929 (1896).
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stitutions, the test being that where inequality is unreasonably (and the word
is strictly construed) great, the statute is invalid1 4 However, there is no
remedy for a legislature's failure to act at all.u
Thus, the voter who is the victim of a failure of the legislature to apportion
is, for all practical purposes, left without a remedy. One proposed solution
is that of the "automatic" apportionment provision to be written into the
state constitution. By this method the duty and the actual reapportionment
is imposed upon an administrative official or agency who could, in an admin-
istrative capacity, be made subject to mandamus. Thus, if the official failed
to apportion, an action could successfully be brought to compel him to do so;
and, if the apportionment enacted were unreasonably unequal, it would, as it
is now, be subject to judicial review.16 This plan is sound but rarely used
and could conceivably suffer from public inertia and the traditionally timid
approach to "unreasonableness" previously mentioned;' 7 the voter still is with-
out practical remedy.
Recently, the traditional doctrine that the courts lack power to compel a
legislature to act was reiterated in Remmy v. Smith,28 but that case specu-
lated that a suit based upon the Civil Rights Act' as well as the Fourteenth
Amendment would present novel questions not yet decided 2 0 Those questions
were raised in the instant case, the significance of which lies in its apparent
about-face in the direction of the march of traditional doctrine.
The instant case takes a bold new tack. The court interprets Colegrove v.
Green2 ' as holding that a case involving voting districts is a judiciable question
over which a federal court has jurisdiction, but that it should not be exer-
cised for fear of intruding upon the delicate area of federal-state relations.
The present case is then distinguished on its facts in that Hawaii, a territory
of the United States and not a state, is not susceptible to the objection raised
in the Colegrove case.
The court, therefore, held that in violation of the Organic Act the failure
of the legislature to act resulted in arbitrary discrimination affecting persons
entitled to similar treatment and was violative of the due process clause of the
14. See 35 Am. St. Rep. 62 (1894); 2 A.L.R. 1337 (1919); 1S Am. Jur., Elections
§§ 13-30 (1938).
15. See notes 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 supra; . .. the requirements of periodic redistricting or
reapportionment fall into the class of judicially non-enforceable providions of the state
constitutions!' Walter, op. cit. supra note 9, at 41.
16. See notes 8, 14 supra. See also Durfee, op cit. supra note 1.
17. Nevertheless one writer, in speaking of the "automatic method", stated, "In no
other way can the duty of reapportionment be enforced." Durfee, op. cit. eupra note 1,
at 1103.
18. 102 F. Supp. 703 (ED. Pa. 1951), appeal dismissed, 342 US. 916 (1952).
19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 19S1 (1955 Supp.) (formerly 8 US.C.A. § 41).
20. 102 F. Supp. at 711.
21. 32S U.S. 549 (1946). Precisely what was decided in the Colegrove case, in rgard
to federal court jurisdiction in cases involving voting districts, is disputed. Compare
comments in Remmey v. Smith, see note 1S supra; South v. Peters, 339 US. 276 (1930);
Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946).
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Fifth Amendment. The court did not reach the question of whether or not
the Fourteenth Amendment was violated since the Fifth Amendment applied
to the plaintiff as a citizen of a territory.22
The decision of the court, though limited by its facts to territorial possessions
of the United States, contains strongly worded dicta calling for the overthrow
of the traditional doctrine.23 The court expresses the belief that the result
should be the same even if Hawaii were a state because the assumed delicacy
of state-federal relations must bow to the principles of the Constitution, as it
did in the Supreme Court decision abolishing segregation in public schools. 24
The decision here is well reasoned. If sustained, and its doctrine extended
to encompass states as well as territories, it may well provide the first prac-
tical solution to an age-old problem.
Evidence-Admissibility of Habit Evidence to Show Negligence.-Plaintiff
brought an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries sus-
tained while working in defendant's railroad freight yard in New York. Plain-
tiff testified he was walking along a path between two parallel sets of tracks,
that the path was strewn with pieces of coal from coal cars, that he tripped
over a lump of coal on the path, lost his balance, and was hit by a moving
train, resulting in the amputation of his leg. Over defendant's objection there
was testimony that the same employees used in cleaning up operations were
also used on construction and maintenance work, and that this was true prior
to and during the month of the accident. On appeal, held, two judges con-
curring in separate opinions, affirmed. In a negligence case based on the FELA
the past conduct of defendant showing a habit of negligence is admissible.
Cereste v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R.R., 231 F. 2d 50 (2d Cir. 1956).
Habit ". . . describes one's regular response to a repeated specific situation."1
In determining evidentiary admissibility a distinction is made between evidence
of a general habit of conducting oneself in a careful or negligent manner2 and
22. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S.
284 (1927).
23. "The time has come, and the Supreme Court has marked the way, when serious
consideration should be given to a reversal of the traditional reluctance of judicial inter-
vention in legislative reapportionment. The whole thrust of today's legal climate is to
end unconstitutional discrimination. . . The legislatures of our land should be made as
responsive to the Constitution of the United States as are the citizens who elect the legis-
lators." 138 F. Supp. at 236.
24. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
1. McCormick, Law of Evidence § 162 (1954); see also, Model Code of Eviderice
rule 307 (1942), "(1) Habit means a course of behavior of a person regularly repeated
in like circumstances. Custom means a course of behavior of a group of persons regularly
repeated in like circumstances."
2. Comment, U.C.LA. Intramural L. Rev. 1 (1952) "It is necessary, however, to
distinguish carefully between this evidence of specific habit and evidence of general habits
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evidence of a specific habit.3 The weight of authority is against admitting
evidence of general habit for the purpose of showing conduct of the same
kind upon the specific occasion in issue.4 It is rejected because of its slight
probative force since a habit of care or carelessness on general occasions is
uncertain evidence of care or carelessness on a particular occasionY While
there is apparent unanimity on the inadmissibility of general habit evidence,
a definite conflict exists on whether specific habit evidence is admissible to
prove or disprove negligence. Mlany jurisdictions exclude evidence of specific
habit to show the doing or not doing of an act.0 The majority rule admits
such evidence for this purpose7 because its highly probative value compels
its admission,8 reasoning that "... a man is likely to do or not to do a thing,
or to do it or not to do it in a particular way, [according] as he is in the habit
of doing or not doing it.' * Some jurisdictions, apparently out of necessity,
admit this evidence in a wrongful death action 0 only where there is an
absence of eyewitnesses to testify upon the issue to be established." It may
also be allowed into evidence where there is conflicting testimony so as to dis-
credit eyewitnesses.' 2
In the instant case one of the concurring opinions raised the question of
whether the federal or the New York rule on habit evidence should be ap-
of care or carelessness. The probative value of the latter is much less than that of the
habit of doing a specific act."
3. E.g., habit of speeding on a motorcycle over a specific road on other occasions;
Boone v. Bank of America, 220 Cal. 93, 29 P. 2d 409 (1934).
4. Rumpel v. Oregon Short Line & U.N. Ry., 4 Idaho 13, 35 Pac. 70 (1394); Petro
v. Hines, 299 I1. 236, 132 N.E. 462 (1921); Smith v. Middleton, 112 Ky. 563, 66 S.V.
38S (1902); Noyes v. Boston & Blaine R.R., 213 Mass. 9, 99 N.E. 457 (1912); Murphy
v. Burney, 27 So.2d 773 (1946); Noonan v. Luther, 206 N.Y. 105, 99 N.E. 173 (1912);
Zucker v. Whitridge, 205 N.Y. 50, 93 N.E. 209 (1912); Green v. Shaw, 136 S.C. 56,
134 S.E. 226 (1926); Note, 15 Notre Dame Law. 48 (1939).
5. Zucker v. Whitridge, 205 N.Y. 50, 65, 93 N.E. 209, 213 (1912). See also 1S A.L.R.
125, 127-35 (1921) and cases cited therein.
6. Zucker v. Whitridge, see note 5 supra, and cases cited therein.
7. Hodges v. Hill, 175 Mo. App. 441, 161 S.W. 633 (1913); Stone v. BoRton &
M.R.R., 72 N.H. 206, 55 At. 359 (1903).
3. See, Wigmore, Evidence § 92 (3d ed. 1940). "Of the probative value of a pa-son's
habit or custom, as showing the doing on a specific occasion of the act which is the
subject of the habit or custom, there can be no doubt."
9. State v. Railroad, 52 N.H. 528, 532 (1873), quoting Wigmore, Evidence § 92
(3d ed. 1940).
10. The necessity appears to be the dilemma of plaintiff's administrator in sowing
that decedent was free from contributory negligence. New York neatly avoids this by
requiring the defendant to show that plaintiff was contributorily negligent in a death
action. See N.Y. Decedent Estate Law § 131.
11. See Boone v. Bank of America, 220 Cal. 93, 29 P.2d 409 (1934); Wallis v.
Southern Pac. Co., 134 Cal. 662, 195 Pac. 403 (1921). See also Note, 51 Harv. L. Rev.
743 (1933).
12. See Notes, 5 U. Ch. L. Rev. 502 (1933); 20 Calif. L.R. 203 (1932). But £ze,
Petro v. Hines, 299 Ii. 236, 132 N.E. 462 (1921).
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plicable. 13 The federal rule excludes evidence of habit, 14 rejecting the argu-
ment that proof of habit to do the thing in question renders it more likely
that it was done at the time. 5 If the court allowed such evidence to be
admitted, it could be rebutted by the party it is offered against by his show-
ing that this was not his habit and the attention of the jury would be di-
verted from the occurrence on the occasion in issue.", The question of which
law to apply would seem to be academic since New York also adheres to the
minority rule and strictly excludes evidence of habit in negligence cases. Its
courts have repeatedly assailed the view that the customary conduct of a
human being on prior occasions to do an act forms a basis for an inference
that the human being did the act on the occasion in question. 17 In the leading
case of Zucker v. Whitridge'8 evidence of the decedent's habit of looking for
cars before crossing tracks was held inadmissible on the issue of whether he
looked before stepping in front of a street car. There were four eyewitnesses
to the accident and the court abstained from deciding whether the evidence
would be admitted in the absence of eyewitnesses. In Parsons v. Syracuse,
Binghamton & New York R.R.,'0 a prior case in which there were no eye-
witnesses, the court decided that evidence of specific instances of care prior
to the accident is inadmissible on the question of care at the time of the acci-
dent. The court reasoned that "a man who is careful on one occasion may be
careless on another. '20  The court in a subsequent case 2 1 felt foreclosed by
previous authority to reverse the trial court for admitting evidence that de-
cedent was an ordinarily cautious man when employed around machinery
although there were no eyewitnesses. It has been held many times since that
all habit evidence is inadmissible to show that an act was done or not done.2
2
13. 231 F. 2d at 57.
14. Thompson v. Bowie, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 463 (1866) (evidence of party's habit to
gamble when under influence of alcohol inadmissible); Louisville v. N.R.R. v. McCllsh,
115 Fed. 268 (6th Cir. 1902) (habit of deceased of jumping on trains where his body
was found was inadmissible).
15. Louisville & N.R.R. v. McClish, 115 Fed. 263, 275.
16. Id. at 276.
17. New York and most other states, however, admit evidence that is similar to habit
evidence, viz., evidence of commercial habits or customs, delivery of mail, transmission
of telegrams, handwriting traits and animal behavior. See Wigmore, Evidence § 95 (3d
ed. 1940); 33 B.U.L. Rev. 205 (1953).
18. 205 N.Y. 56, 98 N.E. 209 (1912).
19. 133 App. Div. 461, 117 N.Y. Supp. 1058 (3d Dep't 1909).
20. Id. at 462, 117 N.Y. Supp. at 1059.
21. Gibson v. Casein Mfg. Co., 157 App. Div. 46, 141 N.Y. Supp. 887 (3d Dep't 1913).
22. See Grenadier v. Surface Transp. Corp., 271 App. Div. 460, 66 N.Y.S. 2d 130 (1st
Dep't 1946) (It is reversible error for a failure to exclude evidence tending to show
that the person by whom the negligent act was committed had previously committed
similar acts or that he was generally negligent); Lefcourt v. Jenkinson, 258 App. Div.
1080, 18 N.Y.S. 2d 160 (2d Dep't 1940) (An action against an apartment owner for
injuries to a child resulting from child's arm going through pane of glass in door of apart-
ment house. Permitting superintendent to testify that on prior occasions he had observed
child opening door by pushing in glass panel was held to be incompetent evidence and
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Such evidence is inadmissible because of the inconvenience of a multitude of
collateral issues,2 3 consequent delay and confusion of jury, - element of sur-
prise, -5 and prejudicial to the party it is offered against20
In the instant case, the court, treating the evidence as establishing a habit
of negligence, admits that "... in negligence cases not based on FELA, most
courts have held such evidence inadmissible. ' 2 7 Various reasons are assigned
by the court for a contrary result in FELA cases. The decisive reason appears
to be persuasive secondary sources,)2  one of which is quoted in extenso.
These sources favor admissibility because of the probative value and useful-
ness of such evidence. Another reason for the court's decision is cases cited
admitting habit evidence when there are no eyewitnvses and in a dictum
Judge Frank, writing for the court, holds that such an exception is without
reason 2 9 The court also contends that Supreme Court decisions have liberally
construed FELA30 in favor of employees and supposes that this was done
on the theory that the statute dictates a policy of extreme concern for their
protection. Since there were no Supreme Court decisions under FELA ex-
cluding habit evidence, this court felt it should be admitted.
Two judges disagreed in separate concurring opinions with the court's
interpretation of the evidence and the rationale of its ruling in holding that
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the evidence. Judge
Hinks thought that the evidence was inadequate to prove a habit but allowed
it into evidence on other grounds.3 ' Judge Waterman also felt that the evi-
dence couldn't be characterized as habit evidence. However, he thought that
it was logically relevant and showed that the coal in the yard had no oppor-
tunity to be removed. Judge Waterman derides the court's resting its conclu-
reversible error.); Flannagan v. Brown, 211 App. Div. 694, 20S N.Y. Supp. 211 (1st
Dep't 1925) (Prejudicial error to show that chauffeur who drove defendant's car had
been convicted of speeding before and after accident for purpose of establithing that he
was not a careful driver.)
23. See Gray v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 143 Iowa 268, 121 N.W. 1097 (1939).
24. See note IS supra.
25. See note 19 supra.
26. See note 18 supra.
27. 231 F.2d 53, 855 (2d Cir. 1956).
28. The court cites McCormick, Evidence; Wigmore, Evidence; Model Code of Evi-
dence rule 307 (1942); Uniform Rules of Evidence rule 50 (1953).
29. "This exception lacks reason; for, if the evidence is highly prejudicial, it is no
less so when eyewitnesses are unavailable." 231 F. 2d at 53.
30. Every railroad ". . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury
while he is employed by such carrier .. . resulting in whole or in part from the negli-
gence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any
defect of insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliance5, machinery,
track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment." 45 US.C.A. § 51. 231 F.2d
at 54, 55.
31. Judge Hincks asserts that the evidence was admitted subject to connection and
that since no move to strike was made when the evidence wasn't connected, the defend-
ant is precluded from complaining on appeal. 231 F.2d at 55, 56.
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sion on secondary sources rather than precedent and the court's postulating of
more liberal rules of evidence in FELA cases.32  He also contends that
actually this evidence is evidence of business custom. If this is so the evi-
dence would be admissible under both New York3 3 and Federal law.a4
The court adopted an arbitrary interpretation of what the rules of evidence
should be in FELA cases. It is submitted that the court erred if it based
its admission of this evidence on the habit evidence theory. Should habit
which is variable and inconsistent be allowed to prove the doing of an act?
The strict rule of inadmissibility would seem to be the safer rule because
habit evidence is of a prejudicial nature, has shallow probative force, and
introduces immaterial collateral issues. It would seem that the slight rele-
vancy of habit evidence to show negligence is sufficiently outweighed by
numerous practical considerations so as to preclude this evidence. The sounder
interpretation of this evidence apparently appears to be the second concurring
opinion which would admit this evidence since it was generally relevant to
show that the defendant had not cleaned up the freight yard prior to the
accident.
Evidence-Jurors' Affidavits Allowed to Impeach Verdict.-Defendant was
tried and convicted of murder in the first degree, without recommendation
for life imprisonment. The Superior Court denied defendant's motion for a
new trial based on jurors' affidavits. These affidavits asserted that certain
jurors had introduced into the jury's deliberations their personal recollection
of having been present in court on a date shortly prior to the trial in the
instant case, and having observed at that time the same defendant entering a
plea of not guilty on an indictment for assault and battery. On appeal, held,
three judges dissenting, reversed. Jurors' evidence of overt or objective acts
of individual juror, may be received to impeach a verdict. State v. Kociolek,
20 N.J. 92, 118 A. 2d 812 (1955).
American and English courts have been troubled with the problem of jurors'
evidence as to occurrences during their deliberations. At the outset, the steps
taken by the jury in arriving at its decision were subject to close examination
by the court.' Bushell's Case established the privilege of jurors to return a
32. Judge Waterman thought that Judge Hincks ". . . intimates, I think erroneously,
that we may formulate different and more liberal rules of evidence In FELA cases
than are applicable in other cases brought in federal courts. I think such a development
would be unfortunate. Rules of evidence applicable in federal courts should not be com-
partmentalized according to the subject matter of the case involved. And the FELA Is a
substantive statute and does not contain or imply rules of evidence." 231 F. 2d at 58.
33. See, Gray v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 187 N.Y. 376 (1907); Shannahan v. Empire Engi-
neering Corp., 204 N.Y. 543, 98 N.E. 9 (1912).
34. Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Schorb, 151 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
786 (1945); Dudley v. Scandrett, 115 F. 2d 728 (9th Cir. 1940); Director General v.
Templin, 268 Fed. 483 (3d Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 254 US. 656 (1920).
1. 1 Holdsworth, History of English Law 337-347 (3d ed. 1922).
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verdict freely according to their conscience. 2 However, there are a variety of
opinions among the jurisdictions as to how far the privilege extends. The ma-
jority of jurisdictions impose a complete ban on jurors' affidavits in any in-
stance where they are intended to impeach a verdictP A frequently cited ob-
jection to them in former days was predicated on the fact that all members
of a jury which based its decision on facts outside those presented at trial
were guilty of a misdemeanor.4 Affidavits by jurors attesting to such conduct
were, therefore, self-incriminating, and for that reason disallowed. That ob-
jection has little or no support today. Jurors' affidavits are now generally
accepted where their purpose is to establish misconduct of jurors and not to
impeach a verdict,5 regardless of any self-incriminatory matter therein. The
juror accused of misconduct is, of course, able to avail himself of his constitu-
tional right to refuse to give self-incriminating testimony. Another frequently
advanced objection to jurors' affidavits is that they destroy the "finality" of
the verdict. This reason, does not appear to be well founded, for, although
"finality" of verdict is desirable, it must certainly yield where it produces an
unjust result. It is made all the more untenable by the fact that "final" ver-
dicts are open to attack by means other than jurors' affidavits. 7 During the
period when jurors' affidavits were barred, there was little inclination to bar
evidence of misconduct within the jury room obtained from persons other than
jurors8 It would therefore seem in the better interests of justice to allow
jurors themselves the ability to right the wrong they may have done to a per-
son on trial.
A minority of American courts has allowed jurors' affidavits to impeach a
verdict.9 Various special circumstances have been found upon which to base
their admission. Some courts admit jurors' evidence of the fact that they ar-
rived at their decision by drawing lots,10 and in a few jurisdictions this is
allowed by statute." Case law also edsts which finds jurors' affidavits admis-
sible in so far as they relate to objective matters or overt acts rather than
mere mental processes, even though they impeach a verdict.'- Jurors' affidavits
will also be accepted when the matter therein relates to jurors' activities out-
side the jury room, but before the verdict was reached. 13 However, there is
judicial unanimity in banning jurors' affidavits which inquire into the mental
2. Bushell's 'Case, Vaughan, 135 (1670).
3. S Wigmore, Evidence § 2349 (3d ed. 1940); People v. Sprague, 217 N.Y. 373, 111
N.E. 1077 (1916).
4. Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11, King's Bench (1785).
5. Clark v. United States, 2S9 U.S. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
6. U.S. Const. Amend.
7. N.Y. Civil Practice Act § 549 is one example.
S. 129 A.L.R. 795, S03 (1940).
9. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2349 (3d ed. 1940).
10. Lawson v. Commonwealth, 273 Ky. 1, 127 S.W.2d 876 (1939).
11. Ibid.; State v. Priestly, 91 P.2d 447, 449 (1939).
12. Whitehead v. State, 115 Neb. 143, 212 N.W. 35 (1927).
13. Pierce v. Brennan, 83 Minn. 422, 86 N.W. 417 (1901). Rose v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co.,
127 Ohio St. 265, 187 N.E. 859 (1933).
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processes by which a verdict was reached. 14 The decision in the instant case
is an example of the minority position that jurors' affidavits, relating to objec-
tive matters and overt acts, will be allowed even though they impeach a
verdict. During the trial of the instant case great care was taken to exclude
any hint of the prior indictment. However, that indictment had been presented
on the same day and in the same room in which the jury for the murder trial
was selected. This unfortunate coincidence resulted in the consideration of the
matter by the jury, and the affidavits leading to defendant's motion for a
new trial.
It is well established that the fact of a prior indictment for another crime,
even of a like nature, is inadmissible evidence. It can be used neither to show
a tendency to crime,15 nor to impeach defendant's credibility. 10
The State defended the exclusion of the affidavits in question on the ground
that an Appellate Court is powerless to consider the mental processes which
lead veniremen to their conclusions. While conceding the State's position
the majority noted that this case presented a problem wholly distinct from
an inquiry into the mental processes of individual jurors. It involved an in-
troduction into the jury's deliberation of matter which was totally outside
the mental processes of the jurors. Since it would have been properly ex-
cluded if introduced at trial as evidence it was clearly prejudicial.
Jurors' affidavit in the instant case indicated that the prejudicial matter
had noticeable effect on the decision reached. It appeared that a recommenda-
tion of life imprisonment of the defendant was defeated largely because of
the improperly introduced facts. The majority pointed out that it was not
necessary that such prejudicial effect actually occur in order to render the
error sufficient for reversal. The mere fact that it was prejudicial constituted
grounds for reversal.17
The admission of jurors' affidavits, when allowed, is a matter of discretion
for the trial judge.' 8 Here the affidavit was rejected by the trial judge. The
dissenting justices, without opinion, chose to uphold this rejection. The ma-
jority aptly notes, nonetheless, that the affidavits were rejected without the
exercise of discretion, since they were rejected as inadmissible, per se, rather
than because of inherent deficiencies.
The majority treatment of this case seems proper. Damaging information
should not be allowed to infiltrate the deliberations of a jury. Such infiltration
subverts the purpose of the rules of evidence. Jurors' affidavits seem the only
practical means of thwarting such infiltration; barring them serves no para-
mount purpose.
14. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2349, 2353 (3d ed. 1940).
15. Bullock v. State, 65 N.J.L. 557, 47 Ad. 62 (1900).
16. People v. Morrison, 195 N.Y. 116, 88 N.E. 21 (1909).
17. State v. McKay, 165 P.2d 389 (Nev. 1946).
18. People v. Chamberlain, 7 Cal. 2d 257, 60 P. 2d (1936).
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Evidence-Section 374-a of the New York Civil Practice Act-Admissi-
bility of "History" Portion of Hospital Record.-Pedestrian, in an action
for injuries, introduced his hospital record as evidence of the treatment he
received. Defendant-motorist was permitted to put in evidence the remainder
of the record. It contained, in the history portion, a statement by the plaintiff
to the entrant substantially conforming with defendant's claim that the latter
had been struck from behind by another car which propelled him into the
plaintiff. The physician who made the entry did not testify. Plaintiff's objec-
tion that the statement was hearsay was overruled. A divided Appellate Di-
vision affirmed the judgment for defendant. On appeal, held, three judges
dissenting, reversed. Section 374-a of the New York Civil Practice Act does
not apply to entries in a hospital record not germane to diagnosis or treat-
ment, since such entries do not reflect the regular course of the hospital's
business. Williams v. Alexander, 309 N.Y. 283, 129 N.E. 2d 417 (1955).
The common law rules admitting business records into evidence progressed
through several stages. The shop book rule, operating to admit the books of a
small shopkeeper where he was a party to the suit,' arose because of his in-
competency as a witness in his own behalf' and the consequent need for
such evidence. Where he employed clerks, the courts insisted that they testi-
fy.3 To insure that the books were accurate, numerous and often arbitrary
restrictions were imposed which not only failed to accomplish their purpose
but rendered the rule of little practical value.4 The more liberal regular en-
tries rule extended to any entry in the regular course of business by one since
deceased who had personal knowledge of the event recorded, and who made
such record at or reasonably near the time of its occurrence.5 Here again there
was a clear necessity for the evidence because of the unavailability of the
entrant and probable reliability due to the circumstances, which were deemed
to induce accuracy.6 Where the element of personal knowledge was lacking,
a third rule came into play whereby the entry was admissible if both the
entrant and his informant testified, the latter that he had accurately imparted
the information, the former that he accurately recorded it.7 This rule did not
actually admit the record as such, but merely permitted it to be put in evi-
dence as embodying the witnesses' "past recollection recorded' 3  Where one
1. Vosburg v. Thayer, 12 Johns, R. 461 (1815).
2. This appeared to be the primary reason for the rule. S Wigrnore, Evidence § 1537
(3d ed. 1940). But see Tomlinson v. Borst, 30 Barb. 42, 46 (1859).
3. Shmargon v. Rosenstein, 192 App. Div. 143, 145, 182 N.Y. Supp. 343, 344 (3d
Dep't 1920).
4. Smith v. Rentz, 131 N.Y. 169, 176, 30 N.E. 54, 56 (1892) (inapplicable to cash
transactions); Vosberg v. Thayer, 12 Johns, R. 461, 462 (1815) (It had to be shown
that some of the articles were delivered and that the party kept honest books.); Sn S
Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1520.
5. Livingston v. Arnoux, 56 N.Y. 507, 518 (1874); 5 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2,
§ 1526.
6. 5 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1522.
7. Mayor v. Second Avenue R.R., 102 N.Y. 572, 579, 7 N.E. 905, 903 (1826).
S. National Ulster Co. Bank v. Madden, 114 N.Y. 280, 21 N.E. 403 (1839).
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or both of the witnesses were deceased, the record might still be admissible if
it were shown that each of them qualified under the regular entry rule.9
The persistence by the courts in rejecting business entries where the party
concerned was at all physically capable of testifying, became exceedingly bur-
densome as modem business increased in size and complexity. Frequently a
great number of persons would be involved in the making of only one record. 10
To bring all in to testify involved great expense, often not commensurate with
the benefits sought." Many jurisdictions softened the application of the rules
and admitted records where the entrant was unavailable due to insanity,12
absence from the jurisdiction,' 3 or other compelling reasons.14 New York con-
tinued to insist that the entrant be dead as a condition precedent to admis-
sion.15 Section 374-a of the Civil Practice Act,'0 enacted in 1928, was prin-
cipally directed toward the alleviation of this problem.' 7 Its primary effect
was to admit business records under specific circumstances, whether the per-
sons concerned were available or not.
The Court of Appeals initially construed the statute in Johnson v. Lutz.18
There a policeman's accident report was held inadmissible on the grounds that
it was composed entirely of hearsay statements acquired from bystanders. The
court also said that obtaining such information was not within the "regular
course of the policeman's business." This would appear contrary to ordinary
belief. Although it was not referred to explicitly, the decision would seem to
have been concerned directly with the second sentence in the statute, which
provides that lack of personal knowledge by the entrant has no bearing on
admissibility. The court interpreted this sentence as declarative of the com-
9. Richardson, Evidence § 228 (8th ed. 1955).
10. See Morgan, The Law of Evidence: Some Proposals for its Reform, at 57-61
(1927) which contains an interesting tabular analysis in this regard.
11. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 122 (1921).
12. Beattie v. McMullen, Weand & McDermott, 82 Conn. 484, 74 AtI. 767 (1909).
13. Pioneer Sand and Gravel Co. v. International Contract Co., 70 Wash. 123, 126 Pac.
84 (1912).
14. McCormick, Evidence § 288 (1954) indicates the farthest limit to which the
courts had gone, permitting a supervising officer to testify on behalf of all the entrants
where it was highly inconvenient to produce them at trial.
15. Leask v. Hoagland, 205 N.Y. 171, 98 N.E. 395 (1912).
16. "Any writing or record, . .. of any act, transaction, occurrence or event, shall
be admissible ... in proof of said act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the trial
judge shall find that it was made in the regular course of any business, and that it
was the regular course of such business to make such memorandum or record at the
time of such act, transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time there-
after. All other circumstances of the making of such writing ...including lack of per-
sonal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but they
shall not effect its admissibility. The term business shall include business, profession,
occupation and calling of every kind." N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 374-a (1953).
17. 5 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1520; McCormick, op. cit. supra note 14,
§ 289.
18. 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930).
mon law rule which would forego personal knowledge of the entrant where
his informant qualified under the regular entry rule. The decision is wholly
justifiable in light of common law principles and, though the case has been
severely criticized,19 it has become settled law in New York.2 2 It seems to
stand for the proposition that the statute will not be interpreted to admit a
pure hearsay statement merely because the writing in which it appears has
qualified under the business entry statute.
The admissibility of hospital records, as embraced within the statute's broad
definition of "business", is settled in New York.2 1 With respect to the admis-
sibility of that portion dealing with the history of the injury, there would
appear to be two aspects to be considered. The first, the fact that the history
almost universally contains statements by an informant outside the personal
knowledge of the entrant, has partially been resolved by the Johnson case
which rejects such a statement where it falls within no exception to the hear-
say rule. The court there implied that the police record would have been ad-
missible had the informants been acting in the regular course of business. It
would seem that the same would be true where an informant's statement falls
within any other exception to the hearsay rule2-a The second aspect, hitherto
undecided in this state, 2 3 is concerned with which, if any, of such historical
entries may be regarded as within the "regular course" of a hospital's business.
The basic problem was encountered early by the United States Supreme Court,
interpreting a similar statute2 4 in Palmer v. Hoffiman,3 which held an acci-
dent report elicited by defendant railroad from the engineer of a wrecked
train inadmissible on the grounds that it was not in the regular course of
business since its contents were not pertinent to the railroad's business as a
railroad. Moreover, the majority of states20 apply similar reasoning specifically
19. 5 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1530. But see Model Code of Evidence rule
514 (1942) which subscribes fully to its holding.
20. People v. Samuels, 302 N.Y. 163, 96 N.E.2d 757 (1951) (statement voluntered
by social worker held inadmissible); Needle v. New York R.R., 227 App. Div. 276, 237
N.Y. Supp. 547 (1st Dep't 1929) (police blotter report based on hearsy held inadmiss-
ble). Also see Geroeam! v. Fancy Fruit and Produce Corp., 249 App. Div. 221, 291
N.Y. Supp. 837 (lst Dep't 1936); Stone v. Goodman, 241 App. Div. 290, 271 N.Y. Supp.
500 (1st Dep't 1934); Wolf v. Kauffman, 227 App. Div. 281, 237 N.Y. Supp. 550
(1st Dep't 1929); Del Re v. City of New York, 1S0 Misc. 525, 42 N.YS. 2d 825 (Sup.
Ct. 1943).
21. People v. Kohlmeyer, 284 N.Y. 366, 370, 31 N.E.2d 490, 492 (1940).
22. Note, 4S Colum. L. Rev. 920 (1948); see Fischer v. City of New York, 207 Mic.
528, 13S N.YS. 2d 754, (Sup. Ct. 1955) (police report and hospital record admitted be-
cause not based on hearsay statements but upon an admission of plaintiff informant).
23. See Richardson, op. cit. supra note 9, § 233.
24. 28 U.S.CA. § 695 (1940). Now 2S U.S.C.A. § 1732 (1950).
25. 313 U.S. 109 (1943).
26. See Higgins v. Loup River Public Power District, 159 Neb. 549, 557, 65 N.W.2d
170, 175 (1955); Brown v. St. Paul Ry., 241 Minn. 13, 24, 62 NAV.2d 6n5, 695 (1954);
Case v. Vearrindy, 339 Mich. 579, 582, 64 N.W2d 670, 671 (1954). Also !e cas s anno-
tated in 144 A.L. 727 (1943).
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to the history portion of a hospital record, holding that, to qualify under the
statute, it must be germane to the business of a hospital, viz., diagnosis or
treatment.
The Court of Appeals in the instant case, adopting the majority rule,
reasoned that the statute was not intended to abrogate the common law in-
sistence upon reliability on the entrant's part. Conceding the inherent trust-
worthiness of a hospital record, not only because it is a business entry but
also because it is relied upon in matters of life and death, the court never-
theless felt compelled to reject the entry in question on the grounds that it
was not part of the hospital's business, as a hospital, to record information
bearing on the cause of an injury, where it was obviously too remote to aid
in the patient's treatment. It concluded that, although the physician might
have been motivated by curiosity, there was no need for him to exercise care,
and it is that habitual care while engaged in his professional function which
produces the reliability sufficient to satisfy both the statute, and the common
law on which it is based.
The dissent contended that the statement was an admission by the plain-
tiff and that, since it was he who offered the record in evidence, he should
not be heard to deny its veracity. The majority never directly answered this.
Conceding that the doctor himself could have testified to the admission, the
court indicated that, since he did not, the only means whereby the statement
might be admissible was by qualifying the history portion under the statute.
Then it would be admissible as the counterpart of his testimony. It might
well have been pointed out further that the mere fact that admissible evi-
dence is mingled with evidence which is not admissible ought not to prevent a
party from proffering the former while withholding the latter. The dissent
appears to have confused a salutary rule which prevents admissions from
being offered "out of context" 27 with the altogether diverse situation in the
instant case where no such possibility exists.
The distinction between the Johnson case and the present decision is that
in the former the court was confronted with hearsay statements contained
in what otherwise would be a reliable report, whereas, in the latter, the prob-
lem is the reliability of the report itself. The sole question before the court
was whether the physician accurately recorded the alleged statement. Sec-
tion 374-a accords admissibility where the record was made in the regular
course of business and it was the regular course of business to make it. The
majority insists that an entry cannot be considered to be the regular course
of a doctor's business unless it pertains to his clinical function. While this
appears to be a correct literal interpretation of the statute, it is questionable
whether it is indicative of the true legislative intent, which can be determined
by regarding the history of the business entry exception. The court over-
looked that it was not essentially the objective content of a business entry
as viewed in retrospect which made it reliable and therefore admissible. Rather
it was the circumstances at the time of the entry which produced a state of
27. Grotton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 92 N.Y. 274, 284 (1883).
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mind conducive to accuracy. The entry in question appears precisely to
have fulfilled such conditions, though in retrospect it may not seem germane
to treatment?3 It is the duty of a physician to record the cause of an injury
because of its potential bearing on physical or mental treatment. What facts
may be of future assistance are, of course, unknown until occasion for their
use arises. Thus, it would be important to record every fact accurately. More-
over, the doctor habitually performs this function and is impartial and, hence,
there is little likelihood of deliberate misrepresentation. Finally, as the ma-
jority points out, the gravity of the subject matter itself, seems to assure more
than usual care. These facts would seem to give rise to a subjective motiva-
tion for accuracy, at least as strong as that of the ordinary business entry. The
situation here would be easily distinguishable from that of the Palmer case,
for example, where the fact that the accident report had no pertinence to
railroading, considered in conjunction with its clearly self-serving character,
affords little reason to presume that the entrant would assure its accuracy.
It is submitted that by rejecting the evidence in question the court neglected
an opportunity to give the business entry statute C.. a rational relation to
the search for truth."2 9
Federal Procedure-Discovery of Grand Jury Minutes in a Subsequent
Civil Action.-Two of the defendants in this civil action had been indicted
previously by a federal grand jury, pleaded guilty and were sentenced. Other
defendants in the instant case were referred to in the indictment as parties to
the conspiracy though not named as defendants therein. The criminal pro-
ceedings had terminated when the government brought the present civil action
under the False Claims Act based upon the same offense which the grand jury
had investigated. Defendants moved under rule 34 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure for discovery of their own grand jury testimony relevant to
the issues involved in the civil suit, and also for the relevant testimony of
other witnesses who were prepared to testify in the civil proceeding. Held,
application for discovery granted. Traditional secrecy of a grand jury pro-
ceeding will not prevent relevant disclosures where the purpose for the pro-
ceeding has ended and the ends of justice require it. United States v. Ben
Grunstein & Sons Co., 137 F. Supp. 197 (D.NJ. 1956).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seek to promote the prompt disposi-
tion of controversies on their merits, to simplify procedure, and to reduce the
possibility of surprise at trial. In furtherance of those purposes, the rules
provide for means of discovery by which a party may obtain a disclosure in
respect to all pertinent information, not privileged, which is in the possession
28. See Cerniglia v. City of New York, 182 Afisc. 441, 49 N.Y.S.2d 447 (Sup. Ct.
1944) where the court held that a history statement, similar to that in the instant case
was germane to treatment and therefore admissible.
29. 5 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1520.
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of any party to the litigation.' The discovery must either facilitate trial
preparation by disclosure of unknown facts, or facilitate the proof of known
facts.2
Under rule 34 a party may, upon a showing of good cause, obtain from the
court in which an action is pending an order directing the adverse party to
permit the moving party to inspect and copy any designated documents con-
taining evidence or which may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence
which is relevant to the subject matter in the pending action, provided the
same is not privileged.3
Although grand jury testimony is traditionally secret and privileged, 4 rule
6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides authority for permit-
ting its disclosure.5 Before a court will exercise that authority, it must be satis-
fied that the reasons for secrecy have been obviated0 or outweighed by the re-
quirements of justice.7 However, it would appear that in no case prior to the
instant decision has a federal court granted disclosure of grand jury testimony
to a civil litigant.8
1. Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41
Mich. L. Rev. 205 (1942).
2. Pike and Willis, Federal Discovery in Operation, 7 U. Chi. L. Rev. 297, 307 (1939);
United States v. 5 Cases, 9 F.R.D. 81, 83 (D. Conn. 1949).
3. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, reads, "Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor
and upon notice to all other parties, and subject to the provisions of Rule 30(b), the
court in which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible
things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence relating to any of the matters
within the scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b) and which are In his
possession, custody or control. .. .'
4. Goodman v. United States, 108 F. 2d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1939); In re Bullock, 103
F. Supp. 639, 642 (D.D.C. 1952); United States v. White, 104 F. Supp. 120 (D.N.J. 1952),
5. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e), reads, "Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand
jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the attor-
neys for the government for use in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a juror,
attorney, interpreter or stenographer may disclose matters occurring before the grand
jury only when so directed by the court preliminary to or in connection with a judicial
proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a show-
ing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters
occurring before the grand jury. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon any
person except in accordance with this rule. . . ." In United States v. Alper, 156 F. 2d
222, 226 (2d Cir. 1946), the court stated that, "Rule 6(e) of the new Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure .. . recognizes, at least by implication, that the court has power
'in connection with a criminal proceeding' to compel disclosure of matters occurring be-
fore the grand jury."
6. Note, 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 319, 320 (1952). See also 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2360
(3rd ed. 1940).
7. United States v. Alper, 156 F. 2d 222 (2d Cir. 1946).
8. In re Bullock, 103 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C. 1952) was neither a civil litigation nor a
criminal action, but rather, a proceeding brought by the Board of Commissioners of the
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Disclosure of the grand jury minutes has been generally denied where the
purpose was to aid the accused in preparation for his criminal trial. The one
exception to this rule has been in perjury prosecutions based upon the defend-
ant's testimony before the grand jury. Here, since the accused's prior testi-
mony is the very issue at bar and due to the possibility of statements being
taken out of context, disclosure has been granted.0
A disclosure may be had for the purpose of attacking the indictment, but it
is incumbent upon the defendant to make positive averments of fact that the
only evidence before the grand jury was incompetent, or illegal, or presented
in violation of defendants constitutional rights, or as a result of fraud, cor-
ruption or caprice.' 0
In a number of criminal actions the government's attorney used grand
jury minutes to "refresh the memory" of prosecution witnesses. The United
States Supreme Court has denied requests for disclosure in such instances by
the defendant, where it appeared that the trial court adopted an appropriate
procedure to insure proper use of the testimony by the prosecutor."
United States v. General Motors is the only reported case which bears close
resemblance to the present case.-2 There the defendants were sued in a civil
case based upon the same charge concerning which they testified before
a grand jury which had refused to indict the defendants. The court denied
defendants' motion for disclosure. It expressly refused to establish the prece-
dent of permitting discovery of grand jury minutes to aid defendants in the
preparation of a civil case. In the General Motors case a sweeping disclosure
was asked, not as here, one confined to those witnesses who were to testify at
the civil trial, including defendants themselves.' 3
District of Columbia, which had supervision of the Metropolitan Police Department, re-
questing disclosure of the grand jury testimony of one of the police officers in order to
determine if that officer had been guilty of dereliction of duty. Under the facts discosd,
the court decided that the public interest would be served best by granting the applica-
tion.
9. United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1954); United States v. Remington,
191 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 907 (1952); United States v.
White, 104 F. Supp. 120 (D.NJ. 1952).
10. United States v. Oley, 21 F. Supp. 281 (E.D.N.Y. 1937); United States v. Perlman,
247 F. 158, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). However, some doubt has been cast upon this rule at
least with respect to incompetent evidence. In United States v. Costello, 350 US. 359,
363 (1956), the Supreme Court refused to quash the indictment though it vas baszd
solely on "hearsay evidence". The Court ruled that "An indictment returned by a legally
constituted and unbiased grand jury ...if valid on its face, is enough to call fer trial
of the charge on the merits!' In a concurring opinion, Ar. Justice Burton asumcs that
the Court would order a quashal where it appeared that no "substantial or rationally per-
suasive evidence" was presented to the grand jury upon which it could base the indict-
ment.
11. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940); St. Clair v.
United States, 154 U.S. 134, 150 (1894). See also Felder v. United States, 9 F.2d 872,
874 (2d Cir. 1925).
12. 15 F.RLD. 486 (D. Del. 1954).
13. Ibid. It may be argued that the sole reason for the courts refusa to grant the
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The court in the instant case concluded that every reason for the secrecy
of grand jury minutes had terminated,1 4 with the exception of "preventing
subornation of perjury", which in its opinion was outweighed by the possi-
bility that surprise might result if discovery were not permitted. A privilege
is extended to persons who have information pertinent to matters under grand
jury investigation in order to encourage their free disclosure of such informa-
tion. This privilege is also limited, the court determined, because these wit-
nesses must expect that if subsequently called in any proceeding, civil or
criminal, they will be asked to testify as to that which they have previously
stated to be the fact before the grand jury. Furthermore, if the privilege were
absolute and they were free from later inquiry as to their testimony, it would
invite possible perjury on the part of the witnesses themselves.
Rule 34 requires a showing of "good cause" before a court will grant dis-
covery of matter not privileged. Defendants here, alleged as "good cause"
the tactical advantage gained by plaintiff by reason of access to the entire
minutes. That in substance was the same reason advanced by defendants in
the General Motors case and one which the latter case deemed insufficient.
The United States Supreme Court has denied discovery of an attorney's "work
product", which enjoys a limited privilege, where the petitioner failed to show
necessity, or an indication that denial would unduly prejudice preparation of his
case or cause hardship or injustice.r' It would seem therefore, that where a dis-
closure is asked of privileged matter more than good cause should be shown.
As the court in the General Motors case noted, only extraordinary circum-
stances, even in a criminal case, should prompt the disclosure of grand jury
testimony to a defendant. In ancillary civil actions, the reasons for disclosure
are no more compelling than those found in criminal cases and are, in fact,
usually less cogent.' 6
The disclosure to defendants of their own testimony before the grand jury
should be least open to objection. A more definite showing of necessity should
be required before the testimony of other grand jury witnesses be revealed.
The argument that the attorneys for the government have a tactical advantage,
in that they may use the grand jury testimony to refresh the memory of wit-
disclosure asked was because of the extent of the request, but nowhere in the courts
opinion is there any indication that a more limited request would have been granted.
14. The court listed the following reasons which were summarized in United States v.
Amazon Industrial Chemical Corp., 55 F. 2d 254, 261 (D. Md. 1931): "(1) To prevent
the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost
freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indict-
ment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation
of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before the grand jury and
later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled
disclosures by persons who have information with respect to the commission of crimes;
(5) to protect an innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that
he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial where there was
no probability of guilt."
15. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509 (1947).
16. 15 F.R.D. at 487-88.
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nesses, may be made in every case where a civil trial is instituted by the
government based upon the same offense which the grand jury was investi-
gating. 7 There is nothing in such an argument which establishes a need to
prepare one's case. Furthermore, such use by the government attorneys is, in
effect, the propounding of leading questions, which can be done only with
leave of the court and under the court's supervision.18 If the government at-
torneys do make such use of the minutes, the judge should examine the por-
tion used and, if there are any inconsistencies, should permit the defense coun-
sel to examine them for the purpose of impeaching the witness. 10
The court in the instant case is not entirely consistent in its attitude toward
disclosure to these defendants. When referring to other grand jury witnesses
who, at the time of the order, were not scheduled to testify at the civil trial,
the court stated that if they are nevertheless called as witnesses "... there-
upon the discovery of their grand jury testimony should be given defendants,
or to the judge himself, to determine if defendants should fairly see it". After
granting a disclosure of the testimony of some witnesses without first examin-
ing it to see if defendants should fairly see it, why the added caution as to
the testimony of subsequent witnesses?
In discussing the grand jury testimony of witnesses not expected to be called
at the civil trial, the court points out that the defendants could, by examining
those witnesses personally, or on deposition, ascertain from them the very evi-
dence they gave the grand jury. The existence of this alternative further illus-
trates the lack of real necessity for permitting even the limited disclosure
which this court granted. Defendants could examine all witnesses in the same
manner. True, it would be more convenient to have a copy of the transcript,
but convenience is no compelling cause for further compromising the grand
jury's traditional secrecy. Public policy supports a reasonable and necessary
inquiry into the domains of privilege.2 0 But it is submitted that this court, in
its desire to harmonize its decision with the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, has created a needless exception which tends to destroy the effec-
tiveness of the basic rule.
Labor Law-urisdiction of Federal Courts Under Section 301 (a) of the
Labor Management Relations Act.-Plaintiff, a common carrier, entered into
a collective bargaining agreement which established an arbitration procedure
as the exclusive means of settling disputes between itself and the defendant
union, and which prohibited a strike by the union as to any matter subject
17. Rule 6(e) specifically provides that disclosures of grand jury tutimony may be
made to attorneys for the government for use in the performance of their dutile. See
note 5 supra.
1S. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940); St. Cair v.
United States, 154 U.S. 134, 150 (1S94).
19. United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F. 2d 76, 7S (2d Cir. 1944); United States v.
Cohen, 145 F.2d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 US. 799 (1945).
20. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 497 (1947).
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to the arbitration clause. The union breached this agreement and plaintiff
brought this action under section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act which pro-
vides that such violations are within the jurisdictional purview of the district
courts notwithstanding the absence of diversity of citizenship. Defendant con-
tended state substantive law is applicable and therefore, no federal question
is presented upon which the federal judiciary could rest its jurisdiction; hence,
the statute is unconstitutional. The District Court upheld the constitutionality
of the section. On appeal, held, affirmed. Congress made a special grant of
"protective jurisdiction" to the federal courts in order to insure enforcement
of collective bargaining agreements. International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Union, AFL v. Mead, Inc., 230 F. 2d 576 (1st Cir. 1956).
Under the National Labor Relations Act, the jurisdiction of the federal
courts was limited to the enforcement of and appeals from decisions of the
National Labor Relations Board.' Congress, having expressed a general dis-
approval of state procedure in relation to labor contract suits,2 granted original
jurisdiction to the federal courts in this field through section 301(a) of the
Taft-Hartley Act 3 which provides that suits for violations of contracts be-
tween an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an in-
dustry affecting interstate commerce,4 may be brought in any federal district
court, without regard either to the amount in controversy or diversity of citi-
zenship.5 However, since article III of the Constitution explicitly defines the
cases and controversies over which the federal judiciary may maintain juris-
diction, the suit must fit within one of the categories set forth therein.0 It is
1. 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(e), (f) (1935).
2. Many states treated unions as unincorporated associations and required that service
of process be made on practically all the members of the union. Court judgments were
being enforced against individuals of the union rather than against the union as a legal
entity. 92 Cong. Rec. 5705 (1946). See 92 Cong. Rec. 5722 (1946); H.R. Rep. No. 245,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). An examina.
tion of the Congressional Record would indicate that the section had a strictly procedural
aim to correct state court processes. The Committee on Education and Labor submitted
a report which stated, "when labor organizations make contracts with employers, such
organizations should be subject to the same judicial remedies and processes ...as those
applicable to all other citizens." H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1947).
3. "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization rep-
resenting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or be-
tween any such labor organization, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties; without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a) (1947).
4. Commerce is defined by the Taft-Hartley Act as commerce among the several
states. 29 U.S.C.A. § 152 (1947).
5. This constitutes a broad jurisdictional grant; neither diversity of citizenship nor
the minimum of $3000. is required.
6. The judicial power of the United States shall extend to: (1) all cases in law or
equity, arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made
under their authority; (2) all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls; (3) all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; (4) controversies to which
the United States is a party; (5) controversies between two or more states; (6) contro-
CASE NOTES
quite clear that section 301 (a) suits must rest solely upon the federal ques-
tion clause.7 Therefore, to sustain the constitutionality of section 301(a), it
must be found to embrace cases which "arise under" the laws of the United
States. Can suits under section 301(a) be said to "arise under" the laws of
the United States?
Prior to 1955, most district courts resolved this Constitutional problem by
holding that the section created federal substantive rights,8 so that all caes
under this section presented the requisite federal question. In that year, how-
ever, Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.9 was decided and, though the issue of constitutionality was avoided,
three justices questioned the validity of section 301(a),13 Justice Frankfurter,
implying that the section may be merely procedural, stated, "If ... Congress
merely furnished a federal forum for enforcing the body of contract law which
the State provides, a serious constitutional problem would lie at the threshhold
of jurisdiction."'1 Under this reasoning, the constitutionality of the section
would hinge on the determination of what sources, whether state or national,
a federal court would be required to draw upon in deciding the underlying
substantive rights of the parties.
The union, in the instant case, argued that these suits do not call for a
determination of federal rights which is prerequisite to an assertion that cases
"arise under" the laws of the United States. The effect of this section in the
union's view was to merely provide a federal forum to determine state issues
and so the requisite federal question for an exercise of federal jurisdiction
would be lacking. Therefore, it contended, section 301(a) is unconstitutional
versies between a state and citizens of another state; (7) controversies betveen citizens
of different states; (3) controversies between citizens of the same state claiming lands
under grants of different states; (9) controversies between a state, or citizens thereof,
and foreign states, citizens or subjects. U.S. Const., art. MI, § 2.
7. The term "federal question" is used to denote those federal isue3 which come
within the "arising under" clause of article III. Section 301(a) eliminates diversity of
citizenship as a basis for jurisdiction, and the other cases under article m over vhich
the federal judiciary may exert jurisdiction are clearly not applicable to labor contract
disputes. For an extensive discussion on this point, see Mishklin, The Federal "Question"
in the District Courts, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 157 (1953).
S. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F2d 376 (Sth
Cir. 1953); Milk & Ice Cream D. & D.E. Union v. Gillespie Milk Products Corp, 203
F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1953); Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers Bldg. and C.L.
Union, 182 F. 2d 80 (2d Cir. 1950); International Plainfield Motor Co. v. Int'l Union,
United A.A. & A.I.W., 123 F. Supp. 633 (D.N.J. 1954); Waialua Agriculture Co. v. United
Sugar Workers, 114 F. Supp. 243 (D. Hawaii 1953); Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Co. v. Textile
Workers Union, 103 F. Supp. 45 (D. Del. 1952). See also 41 Cornell L.Q. 320 (1956),
57 Yale L.J. 630 (194S). But see Textile Workers Union v. American Thrend Co., 113
F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291 of IL. A,--'n, 204 F.2d
495 (3d Cir. 1953).
9. 343 U.S. 437 (1955).
10. Justices Frankfurter, Minton and Burton, while deciding the case on other grounds,
raised serious Constitutional objections to this section.
11. 343 U.S. at 442.
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since the federal judiciary is assuming jurisdiction over cases beyond those
enumerated in article III of the Constitution.
In overruling the union's contention, the court stated that it was prepared
to hold that the section created federal substantive rights; it said, however,
that it was unnecessary to go that far since section 301(a) was constitutional
whether substantive or not. The basis for upholding the validity of the sec-
tion, the court reasoned, rests in the power of Congress to make a special
grant of "protective jurisdiction"' 2 to the federal courts over a field which the
Congress desires to regulate, though the underlying substantive law to be
applied is that of the state. The court held that Congress had designated cer-
tain rules which must be applied in these suits,13 and that the required appli-
cation of these rules constituted a sufficient federal question within the mean-
ing of article III. The court in so holding avoided the issue raised in the
Westinghouse case, viz., whether the section is procedural or substantive, and
predicated the constitutionality of section 301 (a) on the theory of "protective
jurisdiction."
To support its contention, the court relied on the cases of Osborn v. Bank of
the United States14 and Williams v. Austrian.'5 It stated that in both
these cases, Congress conferred a special grant of "protective jurisdiction" over
a field which it desired to regulate, though state law was to control the sub-
stantive issue. The statute considered in the Osborn case was one which gave
to federal courts jurisdiction over controversies to which a federally created
bank was a party, even though the only substantive issues involved might re-
quire the application of state law. In the Williams case, suits instituted by a
trustee in a reorganization proceeding under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy
Act, were held to be within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court,
although again state law was determinative of the substantive issues.
The court distinguished between special and general grants of jurisdiction,
and the basis under which a federal question is found in each.' 6 While a strict
12. The basis for such a grant is that in matters where Congress has enacted a broad
Congressional policy (Taft-Hartley Act), within one of the legislative powers delegated
in the Constitution (commerce clause), Congress is acting within the constitutional mean-
ing of article III in "protecting" this policy by granting jurisdiction to the federal courts
over all litigation connected with and forming a part of such plan. For a further dis-
cussion on this point, see Forrester, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Labor Dis-
putes, 13 Law and Contemp. Prob. 114 (1948).
13. Examples of the rules which are to be applied are: (1) whether the union is a
proper representative, 29 U.S.C.A. § 159 (1947); (2) whether there is a termination of
contract, 29 US.C.A. § 158(d) (1947); (3) that a labor organization shall be treated
as an entity, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(b) (1947).
14. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 326 (1824).
15. 331 U.S. 642 (1947).
16. Congress made a general grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts by statute
when it permitted the removal from the state courts to the district courts of all cases
which arise under the laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(b). This statute
has been construed as meaning that a federal issue must be clearly evident before the
federal courts could exercise the jurisdiction granted under it. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank
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interpretation is applied in construing the federal question requirement under
a general grant, the court noted that the requirement has been liberally con-
strued in cases involving special grants as demonstrated by the Osborn and
Williams cases.
Admitting that a greater leeway for the presence of a federal issue has de-
veloped with respect to special grants, it must be noted that, while the Osborn
and Williams cases involved such grants, they do not go so far as the instant
case.
In the Osborn case, the bank was created by federal act; the bank's very
existence, its right to sue and to be sued, would be founded in federal law.
Federal incorporation of the bank presented the necessary federal question
upon which cases could gain entrance into the federal courts. In the instant
case, neither management nor the unions are federally created and their judi-
cial existence was recognized prior to the passage of section 301(a).
In the Williams case, the trustee under corporate reorganization acquired the
claim upon which he sues by operation of federal law.1 7 In the principal case,
we have a grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts over labor contracts, which
originated in congressional action which was ambiguous as to whether federal
substantive issues were to be created.18 Behind all such special grants would
appear to lie a cause of action in federal law, that is, a statute creating federal
substantive rights which might be asserted in the federal courts.
Neither the Osborn nor the Williams case purport to go so far as to hold
that Congress could make a special grant of protective jurisdiction where the
only federal issues arising are procedural. Support for such a theory within
the district courts which have decided section 301 cases, would appear to be
lacking,'9 and it is debatable whether the Supreme Court2 0 will accept this
view. The divergent views upon the constitutionality of the section suggest
the advisability of having the issue resolved by the Supreme Court.
Practice and Procedure-Immunity of Nonresident Plaintiff from Service
of Process in a Separate Action.-Defendant, a nonresident of New York,
was a plaintiff in another action requiring his presence at a pre-trial examina-
tion under threat of having the complaint dismissed. While in New York, in
attendance at the examination, he was personally served with process in the
present action. Claiming immunity from service of process, he moved to vacate
service of the summons. Held, motion denied. A nonresident who enters the
jurisdiction to bring an action against a resident is not immune from service
299 US. 109 (1936). Judge Cardozo, in that case held ". .. a suit doei not so arise
[under this statute] unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy
respecting the validity, construction or effect of such a law, upon the determination of
which the results depends." Gully v. First Nat'l Bank supra at 114.
17. 11 U.S.CA. § 501 (193S).
18. See note 2 supra.
19. See note 8 supra.
20. See note 10 smpra.
19561
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
of process in a separate action brought by the resident. Resort Airlines v.
Sternberg, 208 Misc. 383, 144 N.Y.S. 2d 70 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
A person properly served with process, while he is within the confines of a
state, is subordinate to the courts of that state and subject to their process.1
This rule, applied without exception, might, however, influence many indi-
viduals who are outside the authority of a state's judiciary to avoid appear-
ing within that state.2 To preclude this possibility the courts have held that,
where a nonresident is indispensable to a legal proceeding in a state, he is
immune from service while in voluntary attendance and for a reasonable time
while coming to and returning from the place of trial.8 It has been said that
the interests of justice require that witnesses familiar with material facts be
present at trials and nothing, therefore, ought to stand in the way of their
giving testimony.4 The immunity would thus promote court attendance of in-
dividuals whose presence could not be compelled.5 The privilege is not ex-
tended to those who are compelled to appear under threat of bail forfeiture,
arrest, coercion, extradition, subpoena, or other compulsion of law0 since it
cannot be said that one who is already under compulsion to attend is encour-
aged to appear by a promise of immunity.
There is some authority outside New York which would deny the privilege,7
but the majority of jurisdictions," and the decided cases in New York have
taken the position that a nonresident coming voluntarily into New York to
testify as a witness or as a party to an action is exempt from service of
process.9 The basic requisite for granting the immunity is that the testimony
of the person claiming it be essential to a legal proceeding. 10 Interested par-
ties, suitors, witnesses, and creditors in bankruptcy have been held to be
immune from service in New York. 1 The tendency of the New York courts
1. Netograph Mfg. Co. v. Scrugham, 197 N.Y. 377, 90 N.E. 962 (1910).
2. Note, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 721 (1920).
3. "The true rule, well founded in reason . . . , is, that suitors, as well as witnesses,
coming from another State .. . , are exempt from service of civil process while in at-
tendance upon court, and during a reasonable time in coming and going." Stewart v.
Ramsay, 242 US. 128, 129 (1916); Parker v. Marco, 136 N.Y. 585, 32 N.E. 989 (1893);
Matthews v. Tufts, 87 N.Y. 568 (1882); Meyers v. Barlock, 281 Mich. 629, 275 N.W.
656 (1937); Cook v. Cook, 132 N.J. Equity 352, 28 A.2d 178 (1942).
4. Diamond v. Earle, 217 Mass. 499, 105 N.E. 363 (1914).
5. Carmody, Manual of New York Civil Practice § 56 (Carr, Finn and Saxe 1923).
6. See note 1 supra; Adriance v. Lagrave, 59 N.Y. 110 (1874).
7. Bishop v. Vose, 27 Conn. 1 (1858); see also Keeffe and Roscia, Immunity and Sen-
timentality, 32 Cornell L.Q. 471, where immunity for defendant-nonresidents as well as
plaintiff-nonresidents is criticized.
8. Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128 (1916); Franklin v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. App.
2d 292, 220 P. 2d 8 (1950); Cotton v. Frazier, 170 Tenn. 301, 95 S.W.2d 45 (1936).
9. Chase Nat'l Bank v. Turner, 269 N.Y. 397, 199 N.E. 636 (1936); Parker v. Marco,
136 N.Y. 585, 32 N.E. 989 (1893); Matthews v. Tufts, 87 N.Y. 568 (1882); Person v.
Grier, 66 N.Y. 124 (1876).
10. Nonresidents who are within this jurisdiction for reasons of their own are not
immune. Chaffee v. Jones, 19 Pick. 260 (1837); Clark v. Grant, 2 Wend. 257 (1829).
11. Kutner v. Hodnett, 59 Misc. 21, 109 N.Y. Supp. 1068 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
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has been to broaden the immunity rather than to restrict it.'- This liberalizing
attitude is exemplified in the case of a person who is compelled to appear in
a criminal action. Ordinarily he is not immune,13 but if such a person is
brought into New York after a waiver of extradition he is not subject to serv-
ice of process in a civil action arising out of the same facts as appear in the
criminal proceeding.' 4
In Roberts v. Thompson,3.5 the Appellate Division determined that the non-
resident plaintiff was immune from service of process even by the resident
defendant whose jurisdiction he has entered to bring an action. In that
case the court, nevertheless, indicated in dictum that strict adherence to
the general rule might conceivably allow an unjust advantage over defend-
ant residents where they have some claim which could not be asserted as a
defense or counterclaim, in which case the court might disregard the im-
munity.' 6 Later, in Petrova v. Roberts,'7 a unanimous Court of Appeals re-
fused to adopt the position of the Thompson dictum. It affirmed a negative
answer to the question certified: "Is a nonresident alien party, who himself
begins litigation in this State in his own interest against a citizen of the State,
amenable to the service of a summons and complaint in an action brought by
the citizen, where the claim upon which the suit of the citizen is brought
existed at the time the action was instituted by the non-resident, but could
not be availed of as a defense or counterclaim therein?"1 8 The court thus
extended the plaintiff nonresident's immunity to its limit.
In 1949 the New York State Legislature, on the recommendation of the Law
Revision Commission which noted the Petrova and Thompson cases,1 9 enacted
section 227(a) of the Civil Practice Act. The statute provides that the at-
torney for a nonresident plaintiff shall be deemed his agent to receive process
where the separate action would have been valid as a counterclaim were the
action brought in the Supreme Court. This section did much to alleviate
prior inequities which existed where a counterclaim was not possible.
In the instant case, the nonresident cited New England Industries v. Mar-
giotti,20 as authority for a nonresident litigant's immunity from service. The
court distinguishes that case by pointing out that the nonresident seeking
immunity in the Margiotti case attended as a defendant, whereas this non-
resident entered the jurisdiction as a plaintiff. However, since there is ample
authority in New York granting immunity to plaintiffs as well as to defend-
ants, this distinction does not seem to be material. The court further reasoned
12. Chase Nat'l Bank v. Turner, 269 N.Y. 397, 199 N.E. 636 (1936). W1here a non-
resident came into New York to attend the argument of her appA. She was held privi-
leged with immunity from service.
13. See note 6 supra.
14. N.Y. Code Cr. Proc. § 855 (1936).
15. 149 App. Div. 437, 134 N.Y. Supp. 363 (4th Dep't 1912).
16. Id. at 438, 134 N.Y. Supp. at 363.
17. 245 N.Y. 513, 157 N.E. 841 (1927).
18. Id. at 519, 157 N.. at S41.
19. N.Y. Law Rev. Comm., 1949 Rep. at 174.
20. 270 App. Div. 48S, 60 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1st Dep't 1946).
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that ". . . a nonresident of this State, may not, on the one hand, use our courts
for the purpose of instituting his own causes . . . and, on the other hand . . .
seek to avoid process in another action instituted by the very same party
whom he is suing . .. "21 This is the identical position which the Court of
Appeals rejected in its ruling in Petrova v. Roberts.22
It would seem that this resident should have brought a counterclaim in the
original action if that was possible; since he did not, he could have circum-
vented the nonresident's immunity by serving the nonresident's attorney in
compliance with the statute.23 Having failed to comply with the statute,
which did not abrogate the Petrova case,24 he is left to the common law rule
granting immunity to nonresident plaintiffs.
Torts-Negligence-Sales-Suit by Consumer Against Manufacturer in the
Absence of Privity.-Plaintiff purchased from the Lockheed Corporation air-
planes which contained engines manufactured by defendant. Plaintiff sued for
the cost of repairs, alleging that the engines were inherently dangerous because
negligently constructed. On motion to dismiss, held, motion granted. There is
a cause of action against the manufacturer only when the article which is
inherently dangerous, because negligently made, causes an accident. Trans
World Airlines v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S. 2d 284
(Sup. Ct. 1955).
Ordinarily, a manufacturer is not liable to the ultimate user of his product
unless there is privity of contract,' but the rule is subject to broad exceptions.
Because of the difficulty of proving negligence by the manufacturer while the
chattel was in his possession, many jurisdictions have permitted the consumer
to recover under the theory of contract.2 However, New York3 and the weight
21. 208 Misc. at 384, 144 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
22. See note 17 supra.
23. This statute is modeled after similar statutes in Massachusetts and California and
is substantially the same. Both of the statutes have been held to be constitutional. Adam
v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938); Young v. McNeal-Edwards Co., 283 U.S. 398 (1931).
24. Landsman v. Rubinowitz, 208 Misc. 126, 144 N.Y.S.2d 241 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
1. Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903); Winter-
bottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
2. To circumvent the absence of privity in fact, some jurisdictions have found privity
by means of the following legal fictions. When the manufacturer advertises, he makes
an offer to the public to guarantee his product, and thus a unilateral contract comes into
existence. Randall v. Goodrich-Gamble Co., 238 Minn. 10, 54 N.W. 2d 769 (1952);
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. 2d 409 (1932). The warranty runs with
the title as in real property. Prosser, Torts § 84 (2d ed. 1955). The contract between
the manufacturer and the dealer is made for the benefit of the consumer, thus making
him a third party beneficiary. Prosser, supra. This latter theory is of doubtful validity
since to permit recovery by a third party, the contract must have been made for his
direct benefit; the benefit cannot be one that is merely incidental. Moch Co. v. Rensse-
laer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
3. Turner v. Edson Storage Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 161 N.E. 423 (1928); Chysky
v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923).
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of authority refuse to permit recovery in contract, in the absence of privity,
since to do so would render uncertain the law of warranties and encroach upon
essential elements of contract law.4
The New York cases have overlooked the lack of privity under certain cir-
cumstances when the action is brought in negligence. In Thomas v. Winches-
ter,5 it was held that the manufacturer of an inherently dangerous product
is liable to the ultimate user, even in the absence of privity. This rule was
extended by Devlin v. Smith0 where an employee of the purchaser of a defec-
tive scaffold was killed, and by two subsequent cases in which third parties
were injured by an exploding bottle of aerated water, 7 and by an e-xploding
coffee urn.s These cases laid the groundwork for MacPherson v. Buich Motor
Co.9 which has become the leading case on the subject.
In the MacPherson, case the plaintiff was injured when a defective wheel
on the automobile that he was driving collapsed. The Court of Appeals ruled
that a manufacturer is liable for his negligence, even if there is no privity,
if the chattel becomes inherently dangerous when negligently made, and if
there is a probability that personal injury or property damage will result.
In the MacPherson case, the plaintiff was the ultimate purchaser, and received
personal injuries, but the rule was later extended to cover other situations. 0
Subsequent cases extended the cause of action to the purchaser's employees,"
to other users of the chattel,'- to bystanders,1 " and to owners of other prop-
erty to which the chattel caused damage.' 4
Courts have allowed recovery where the negligently made chattel itself was
damaged,' 5 but in all such cases, the damage occurred as the result of an ac-
cident. The court in the instant case relied upon AJ.P. Contracting Corp. v.
Brooklyn Builders Supply Co.,'6 where the chattels in question were building
laths which failed to retain plaster, and plaintiff sued for the cost of remov-
4. Comment, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 425 (1955).
5. 6 N.Y. 397 (1S52).
6. 89 N.Y. 470 (1882).
7. Torgeson v. Schultz, 192 N.Y. 156, 84 N.E. 956 (1903).
8. Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N.Y. 478, 88 N.E. 1063 (1q09).
9. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
10. See Davis, A Re-Examination Of The Doctrine Of MacPherson v. Buick And Its
Application And Extension In The State Of Nev, York, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 204 (1955).
11. Rosebrock v. General Elec. Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 140 N.E. 571 (1923).
12. Hoenig v. Central Stamping Co., 273 N.Y. 485, 6 N.E.2d 415 (1936).
13. McLeod v. Linde Air Products Co., 318 Mo. 397, 1 SAV.2d 122 (1927).
14. Genesee County Patrons Fire Relief Ass'n v. L. Sonneborn Sons Inc., 263 N.Y.
463, 189 N.E. 551 (1934).
15. International Harvester Co. v. Sharoff, 202 F.2d 52 (10th Cir. 1953); Quacken-
bush v. Ford Motor Co., 167 App. Div. 433, 153 N.Y. Supp. 131 (3d Dp't 1915).
16. 171 Misc. 157 11 N.YS.2d 662 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd without opinion, 253 App.




ing and replacing said laths. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that it failed to state a cause of action, since there was no accident.
To agree with the opinion and preclude recovery unless there is an accident,
would be placing a myopic restriction on the broad, progressive spirit of the
MacPherson doctrine.
The sounder approach to the problem is through an extension of the Mac-
Pherson rule to its logical terminus, and permit recovery regardless of whether
or not there is an accident. Many legal writers favor the abandonment of
the privity requirement when these actions are brought in negligence. 1 Why
should courts feel bound to follow a rule which was first pronounced when
the manufacturer-consumer relationship was so different from today?' 8
To allow a recovery in tort in the instant case, the court reasoned, would
virtually abolish the necessity for the law of warranties. Actually this is a
misconception since the cause of action would be limited to cases where the
chattel is inherently dangerous or becomes so because of its negligent construc-
tion, and would not apply where ordinary goods were merely of inferior qual-
ity. The need for privity would still exist in the majority of cases, since most
chattels do not fall within the "inherently dangerous" category.
The holding of the instant case is anomalous, for it actually penalizes the
plaintiff for its diligence. No one would deny that if a plane fitted with the
defective engines had crashed, plaintiff would have recovered not only the
value of the engines, but also the value of the plane itself. But, according to
this decision, by discovering the defects and thus averting catastrophe, plain-
tiff is precluded from recovery. The court, in attempting to justify its hold-
ing that an accident must occur, cites the following quotation from a Court
of Appeals decision: "Though negligence may endanger the person or property
of another, no actionable wrong is committed if the danger is averted."'1
The case in which this statement was made turned on the question of when
the statute of limitations begins to run. The quoted statement is not authority
for the court's holding that there must be an accident before a cause of action
accrues under the MacPherson rule. It merely means that there must be some
injury to person or property before there is any actionable negligence, at which
17. "Privity is no longer the fetish that it was fifty years ago .... [T]he opinion of
Judge Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. has given to privity what may be
hoped will prove a mortal wound." Bohlen, Fifty Years Of Torts, 50 Harv. L. Rev.
1225, 1232-33 (1937). In speaking of the rule that there can be no recovery in the ab-
sence of privity, another writer has said: "Exception after exception has become as well
recognized as the general rule and some of the more recent cases seem to forecast that
... the old rule will be abandoned altogether." Feezer, Tort Liability Of Manufacturers,
10 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1925).
18. "The law is progressive and expanding, adapting itself to the new relations and
interests which are constantly springing up in the progress of society." Feezer, Tort Lia-
bility Of Manufacturers, 19 Minn. L. Rev. 752, 762 (1935), quoting Hadger v. New
England Screw Co., 1 R.I. 340 (1850).
19. Schmidt v. Merchants Dispatch Trans. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 300, 200 N.E. 824, 827
(1936).
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point the statute of limitations begins to run. In the instant case there was
an injury to property when the engines became inoperative.
In order to reconcile the instant case with the MacPherson and subsequent
cases, it would be necessary to say that a manufacturer owes no duty to the
consumer until an accident occurs. Then, however, although the chattel is
no longer under the manufacturer's control, a duty suddenly arises. Would it
not be more logical to recognize the fact that the duty exists from the moment
the manufacturer undertakes the construction of the chattel? As one writer
has expressed it, ". . . there is a duty, when the thing is dangerous or, if
defective, likely to be so, to know that it is not defective, and it is the negli-
gence in not performing this duty which is made the basis of liability."t-0
Torts-Negligence-Violation of Assured Clear Distance Statute-Con-
tributory Negligence as a Matter of Law.-Upon entering a tunnel, plain-
tiff driver found his vision temporarily impaired by the sudden change from day-
light to darkness and he reduced his speed. Nevertheless, he was unable to see
defendant's unlighted truck parked inside the tunnel in time to avoid hitting it.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held, one justice dissenting, plaintiff contribu-
torily negligent as a matter of law in failing to stop his vehicle within the
assured clear distance ahead. Notarianni v. Ross, 384 Pa. 63, 119 A. 2d 792
(1956).
Contributory negligence has been defined as conduct on the part of the
plaintiff, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which
falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own safety.1
Proof of the existence of contributory negligence is generally a bar to recov-
ery2 except in cases of willful torts,3 where the conduct of the defendant has
been so unconscionable as to be called wanton or reckless 4 or where the "last
clear chance" doctrine applies.3 While it is usually a question of fact, courts
often declare that certain acts done by plaintiffs amount to contributory neg-
ligence as a matter of law.6 The violation of a statute designed to prevent the
type of accident that has occurred is contributory negligence as a matter of
law In the principal case the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
but judgment for the defendant was entered non obstante vcredicto because the
plaintiff had violated a section of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code forbidding mo-
20. Feezer, Tort Liability Of Manufacturers And Vendors, 10 Blinn. L. Rev. 1, 19
(1925).
1. Restatement, Torts § 463; Prosser, Torts § 51 (2d ed. 1955).
2. Restatement, Torts § 467.
3. Donahoo v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 275 S.W.2d 244 (1955).
4. Kasanovich v. George, 34S Pa. 199, 34 A.2d 523 (1943).
5. Prosser, Torts § 52 (2d ed. 1955).
6. Restatement, Torts § 476, Comment (a).




torists to drive at a speed greater than will permit them to stop within the as-
sured clear distance ahead.8 This doctrine has been said to have existed at
common law in Pennsylvania, 9 but prior to 1929 the Code had merely re-
quired that drivers proceed at a reasonable and prudent speed such as would
not endanger life or property.10 The addition in that year of the assured clear
distance clause left little doubt as to the standard of care to be observed
thereafter. The test is undoubtedly stricter than that of the reasonable man
but it has been consistently applied in similar situations." It has even been
used to rebut the presumption that a deceased motorist has exercised due
care. 12 Where the accident has happened at night the measure of the assured
distance is the range of the headlights.' 3 This does not mean, though, that
the statute is invoked without regard for extraordinary circumstances. Where the
facts warrant, an exception has been recognized. Thus, in addition to a statu-
tory exemption in favor of policemen, firemen and ambulance drivers in the pur-
suit of their duties,14 the courts have excused the non-compliance of a driver
who has been temporarily blinded by the headlights of oncoming traffic", or
one who has collided with a vehicle that has suddenly crossed his course of
travel.16 Pennsylvania, however, has repeatedly denied an exception when
the plaintiff's only defense is that his view was obscured by hazardous at-
mospheric conditions. 17 The theory underlying the exceptional cases seems to
be that a driver who has presumably been maintaining his assured distance
ahead has suddenly been deprived of such assurance by the intervention of
an independent force at some intermediate point along that distance.' 8 Clearly,
then, the present case would not fall into such a class for, as the court points
out, the darkness of the tunnel was as obvious at a distance as is a fog bank.
To the extent that his assured distance was diminished by the darkness,
plaintiff was bound to reduce his speed; this he failed to do.
An anomaly appears in the law of Pennsylvania when the driver colliding
from the rear is the defendant in a particular case. Though he has appar-
ently been unable to stop within the assured clear distance ahead the ques-
8. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 75, § 501(a) (1929).
9. Griffith v. Weiner, 373 Pa. 184, 95 A. 2d 517 (1953).
10. Art. X, § 1002(a) of Act of 1927.
11. Simrell v. Eschenbach, 303 Pa. 156, 154 Atl. 369 (1931); Lauerman v. Strickler, 141
Pa. Super. 240, 14 A.2d 608 (1940).
12. See note 9 supra.
13. Commonwealth v. Aurick, 138 Pa. Super. 180, 10 A. 2d 22 (1939).
14. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 75, § 501(f) (1929).
15. Young v. New York Auto Carrier Co., 364 Pa. 351, 72 A. 2d 68 (1950).
16. Reidinger v. Lewis Jones, Inc., 353 Pa. 298, 45 A. 2d 3 (1946).
17. Lauerman v. Strickler, 141 Pa. Super. 240, 14 A. 2d 608 (1940).
18. "There is no excuse for a failure to obey the statutory requirement unless the
obstacle in front is for the first time in the driver's view, after the car has passed the
point where the 'assured clear distance ahead', quoad that point, has been reached and
passed, and the obstacle is then too close to be avoided." Stark v. Fullerton Trucking Co.,
318 Pa. 541, 544, 179 Atl. 84, 86 (1935).
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tion of his negligence is submitted to the jury.10 The statute is not always
mentioned2" and when it is, it is not controlling.2 1
The doctrine of the assured clear distance ahead has been followed in a
number of other states. Like Pennsylvania, some have made it statutory in
form22 while others apply it as a common law theory.2 Among the former,
none was more extreme than a Wisconsin statute, since repealed, which for-
bade a driver to proceed at a speed greater than would permit him to stop
his vehicle within one-wif the range of his vision.24 In enforcing their enact-
ments the various states do not present a consistent picture. Michigan courts
have demanded strict compliances but in New York it has been held that
the mere occurrence of an accident does not mean that the statute, which is
similar, has been violated. 6 The doctrine seems to have enjoyed a more dis-
cretionary application where it is adhered to on a common law basis. There,
a plaintiff whose car collides with the rear of another's while driving in a fog
may still recover. 7 There are also jurisdictions in which the assured clear
distance rule has not been accepted on any basis, the reason given being
that each case should be decided on its own facts and circumstancesP In a
thoughtful analysis of the problem, a recent Missouri case recognized the value
of the doctrine generally but rejected it as an inflexible standard by -which to
measure negligence. 9
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Mlusmanno, a successful campaigner
against finding contributory negligence as a matter of law,30 would advocate a
return to the reasonable man test. His arguments would perhaps be persua-
sive if the rule were one of purely common law origin. It is impossible, though,
to avoid the words of the Vehicle Code as it exists in Pennsylvania especially
in view of its statutory history. A decision other than the one reached in the
instant case would have contradicted an established principle of state law
and disregarded the obvious intent of the legislature.
19. Simmons v. Jesse C. Stewart Co., 346 Pa. 54, 29 A. 2d 53 (1942).
20. Mazi v. McAnlis, 365 Pa. 114, 74 A. 2d 10S (1950).
21. Meek v. Allen, 162 Pa. Super. 495, 59 A.2d 370 (1948). In this case both cars
were moving at the time the accident occurred.
22. 2 Mich. Comp. Laws § 256.305 (194); N.Y. Vehicle and TraIlic Law § S6(1)
(1946).
23. Kansas Transp. Co. v. Browning, 219 F.2d 890 (10th Cir. 1955); Roth v. Blom-
quist, 117 Neb. 444, 220 N.W. 572 (1928).
24. W s. Stat. § 85.40(5) (1939), repealed by Wis. Sess. Laws 1943, c. 438.
25. Waterstradt v. Lanyon Dock Co., 304 Mich. 437, 8 N.W. 2d 128 (1943).
26. Weisinger v. Macduff, 2S3 App. Div. 607, 139 N.YS.2d 531 (Ist Dep't 195).
27. Renaud v. New England Transp. Co., 286 Mass. 39, 139 N.E. 789 (1934).
28. Marshall v. Sellers, 188 Md. 508, 33 A.2d 3 (1947).
29. Johnson v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 261 S.W.2d 95 (193).
30. In Perpetua v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 3S0 Pa. 361, 112 A.2d 337 (1935), fr.
Justice Musmanno dissented to a court opinion which non-suited, as contributorkly negligent,
a plaintiff who had failed to see the defendant go through a red light. A few months later
he wrote the opinion of a unanimous court which refused to enter judgment for a de-
fendant non obstante veredicto in an identical fact situation, Koehler v. Schwartz, 382
Pa. 352, 115 A.2d 155 (195).
19561 CASE NOTES
